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Introduction: Re-framing the Conflict between “Tutsi” and “Hutu” 
 
 
This thesis examines precolonial Rwandan religion as the locus of cultural 
collaboration and discourse between socioeconomic classes inhabiting geographically 
disparate regions. I focus on the two hundred years prior to colonization, during which a 
strong central kingdom, ruled by a monarch and court of nobles and advisers, expanded 
the boundaries of the central domain to incorporate the peripheral regions. While 
scholarship has presented the central court as imperialistic and expansive, provoking 
violent revolution from oppressed outsiders, the emphasis on conflict has led to the 
neglect of the modes of discourse that occurred in conjunction with these movements. 
These modes of discourse appear clearly in the religious myths and rituals that the 
opposing groups utilized. To much of the world, Rwanda carries the strong connotation 
of ethnic conflict, which area scholarship has also emphasized. This emphasis has also 
served in part to reify Hutu and Tutsi as distinct and fundamentally opposed groups. 
This is true even for scholars like Mahmood Mamdani who see the terms “Hutu” and 
“Tutsi” as appropriate only in reference to what he describes as polarized political 
identities, eschewing any biological or cultural distinctions that previous colonial 
scholarship had proliferated (22). While Mamdani notes that Hutu and Tutsi fought on 
either side during the Nyabingi revolt, the emphasis is still on conflict, rather than the 
discourse that surrounded the conflict (105). Including the discourse is essential to 
understand the way that Rwandans—both elites and their subjects—used traditional 
institutions in order to shape and influence society as part of a discursive process of 
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power and resistance. 
 
By discussing this conflict in the precolonial history in terms of its potential for 
confrontation and exchange of power, this thesis begins the process of redressing the 
continuous emphasis on the Tutsi-Hutu conflict. The shift Mamdani recommends, to 
seeing the identities as essentially political, successfully illustrates the point that “Hutu” 
and “Tutsi” identities have undergone continuous reconstruction over time. However, to 
assess these identities as political is not accurate to the period of history prior to 
colonization, during which time the terms referred instead to social class or status that 
were politically cohesive sometimes and in opposition in other contexts. Furthermore, to 
reduce the Tutsi-Hutu relationship to their history of conflict can equally spur a return to 
violence.  This reductionist understanding of the groups as being in conflict was a 
catalyst rather than a result of the 1994 genocide; it is furthermore seen in the current ban 
on ethnic identity by the Tutsi-led government (Scott and Waldorf 4) that nonetheless 
excludes Hutu candidates from political participation at the level of government as well 
as civil society (Longman “Reform” 28). The exclusive emphasis on conflict has been to 
the detriment of the complete picture of Rwandan history and culture. This deficit in turn 
has led inevitably to the persistence of stereotypes that see the “Other” as being 
untrustworthy and essentially antagonistic to the identity that a person or group self- 
applies. 
This introduction will address some of the ways in which scholarship has 
represented Tutsi and Hutu groups as being essentially in conflict, with the purpose of re- 
characterizing the relationship between them. The remainder of the thesis will focus on 
the precolonial era, in keeping with the assertion by Mamdani that polarization between 
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Tutsi and Hutu as political entities did not come into effect until the Social Revolution of 
1959, which drew on false information proliferated during colonization. Even from that 
point in time, however, a view of the two groups as politically polarized should not hold 
as absolute.  Mamdani points to efforts and opportunities for rapprochement under 
Juvenal Habyarimana's administration (138-142).  Furthermore, many Hutu moderates 
and dissenters were victims of the 1994 genocide, even though the Tutsi were the official 
targets of the genocide (5, 267). The emphasis on precolonial history furthermore aims to 
reaffirm the indigeneity of both groups to Rwanda, as well as the indispensable role of 
both as cultural creators and political actors in ways that were collaborative as well as 
confrontational. 
Area scholars have long held to be anachronistic the interpretation of Tutsi and 
Hutu as constituting separate tribes or even biologically discrete ethnicities (the view of 
Tutsi as “Nilotes” or “Hamites” from northeastern Africa and Hutu as “Bantu” from the 
south and west). Philip Gourevitch's widely read journalistic account of the genocide and 
its aftermath, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our 
Families, noted that there was insufficient evidence for the migration hypothesis of Tutsi 
and Hutu origins.  He also supported the idea that Tutsi and Hutu had shared a culture 
and had intermarried prior to colonization. He did not, however, offer any alternative 
explanation for the origins of the two groups; his discussion asserts that “classes,” 
“castes,” or “ranks” are all equally applicable to the organization of society prior to 
colonization; he relies upon the fast occupational distinction that holds Hutu to be 
agriculturalists or farmers, while Tutsi were exclusively herders (47, 48). Except for the 
note about a shared culture and intermarriage, Gourevitch's 1998 publication reproduces 
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a number of very old misconceptions about the precolonial society. Although there is the 
suggestion that some fluidity between the groups existed as a result of the shared culture 
or intermarriage, Gourevitch suggests a hard division—tantamount to a caste division— 
in which one's identity predetermines one's occupation and status. 
Scholarship over the past fifty years has done much to overturn the idea that Tutsi 
and Hutu were caste identities or that a hard occupational division existed. Much of the 
credit for the shift in the scholarly consensus goes to Jan Vansina, whose book 
L'évolution du royaume Rwanda des origines à 1900 (recently updated and republished 
as Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyiginya Kingdom) looked at a long history of 
cultural and social processes that created distinctions of status between people all of 
whom inhabited the area for several hundreds of years. Vansina's work also creates new 
paradigms for understanding the usage of these ethnonyms in precolonial society. 
Mahmood Mamdani's more recent work, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, 
Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, also provides insight on the history of these 
identities, which have undergone several periods of reconstruction since the terms' 
earliest usage. Mamdani offers a rigorous poststructuralist critique of colonial sources 
that relied on purportedly cultural or biological distinctions between groups as the 
determinative factors in distinguishing between different races or ethnicities. Instead, 
Mamdani analyzes race and ethnicity as essentially political identities (22). 
Both Vansina and Mamdani sought to address the history of violence between 
Hutu and Tutsi—of which 19th and 20th century history provided several dramatic 
examples—in their respective studies. Vansina first argued for the origin of the Hutu- 
Tutsi distinction during the rapid expansion and centralization of the 19th century.  At an 
5 
 
 
earlier phase in the history of the region, these terms had signaled the distinction of an 
elite category from a peasant category. Vansina points to Nyabingi and other spirit- 
possession revolts, beginning in 1897, as evidence that Hutu and Tutsi were absolute 
rather than relative categories and that a hard division existed between the two groups, 
already politically polarized by this date. In consequence, Vansina asserts that hostility 
between these groups was not a product of colonization; Europeans, he argued, merely 
adopted practices they found on arriving, applying court terms to the organization of 
society (Antecedents 138). 
In contrast to Vansina, Mamdani works from the point of view that “Tutsi” and 
“Hutu” have never designated concrete social groups but have continuously undergone 
re-construction. This did not change until in the 1920s and '30s the Belgian 
administration systematically restructured Rwandan society to fit their racial views (88). 
Following the concrete racial division that Belgium imposed on Rwanda, Mamdani 
recounts a number of political changes that still had to occur before “Hutu” and “Tutsi” 
appear as polarized political identities, a date Mamdani sets at the Social Revolution on 
1959. Mamdani specifically rejects the argument that the Nyabingi revolt reflects an 
example of explicit Hutu-Tutsi violence, as Vansina argued. Mamdani reasons that Hutu 
and Tutsi were on both sides in the conflict (105). 
Neither Vansina nor Mamdani disputes the idea that violence between groups of 
disparate economic and geographical location occurred prior to colonialism, nor that 
economic exploitation against peripheral societies occurred from the center. While 
Vansina's analysis takes no account of relevant events occurring during or after 
colonization, he and Mamdani alike emphasize the Nyabingi revolt as a crucial example 
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in terms of categorizing the kind of conflict occurring within Rwanda. While Vansina 
sees it in almost epoch-making terms, the beginning point of Tutsi-Hutu violence, 
Mamdani sees the Nyabingi revolt primarily as an interesting and important example of 
political conflict. Mamdani states: “The polarization of Hutu and Tutsi in 1959 
contrasted dramatically with the presence of Hutu and Tutsi on both sides of the firing 
line during the Nyabingi revolt only half a century earlier” (105). 
Because both scholars seek to explain violence in Rwanda, both look at instances 
of confrontation in terms of how they illustrate the trajectory of violence or of conflict 
between groups. By investigating the points of contention during the Nyabingi revolt, 
however, it is also possible to see the conflict in terms of how it represents cultural 
collaboration, even while it serves as an example of confrontation. This necessitates 
taking a serious look at what issues were of importance to either group, as well as what 
means they used to express demands and organize the cause. This is possible through 
analysis of the religious institutions of both the court and revolutionary movement. My 
approach in discussing precolonial religion as a dialectical process or collaborative 
process derives from methodologies in religious studies that regard myth and ritual as 
cultural phenomena that speak to political contingencies.  To emphasize conflict but 
leave out the relevant elements of discourse is to miss the factors of cultural creation that 
occur in some social confrontations. In particular, this is true of resistance movements 
that oppose unjust power structures by addressing the moral, philosophical, or spiritual 
justifications that actors in those power structures use in legitimating oppression. The 
Nyabingi revolt(s) of the late 19th and early 20th centuries provide an excellent example 
 
of this kind of cultural production, the significance of which has yet to fully escape 
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Western prejudices, which see violence as a problem endemic to Rwanda but that have 
not adequately seen the significance of common points. 
To properly address the topic of Nyabingi revolts as a collaborative strategy in 
which the peripheral group acts upon or against the center, it is first necessary to examine 
the relevant strategies of legitimation espoused by the central court.  I have selected 
origin myths from the oral tradition that the court used to justify an oppressive social 
arrangement, while at the same time discussing these myths as arranging for fluidity and 
opportunities for social advancement not noted elsewhere. In the second chapter, I show 
that the justification of divine kingship was of active use through ritual in both 
distributing power across a large geographic space and for reflecting the court's view of 
its reciprocity with its subjects. This reciprocity, in the court's ideology existed for the 
good of the subjects of the kingdom: through participation in the court's economic 
infrastructure, wealth and prosperity would ultimately come to the subjects (“Hutu”) as 
well as the nobility (“Tutsi”). 
The chapters on court myths and rituals operate on two levels: on the one hand, I 
have articulated and expounded upon the ideologies encoded within the relevant religious 
forms. On the other hand, I have sought to contrast the historical realities of central 
expansion and economic exploitation with the societal ideals the court attempted to 
project. These chapters do not aim at a vindication of court practices, religious, cultural, 
or economic. Instead, I have attempted to seriously examine justifications of the exercise 
of power as well as concessions of an elite group to its subject population. I have not 
attempted to overturn the scholarship indicating that the court exploited peripheral areas 
by returning to a court-centered functionalism.  These chapters will provide the context 
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for the cultural values and ethics the court claimed to represent but failed to 
implement in practice. This in turn will establish a pretext for revolutionary action on 
the part of peripheral groups who, nevertheless, saw themselves as participants in the 
same cultural context as the central court. 
The third chapter focuses on the Nyabingi revolt as a revolutionary action 
from the margin against the central power, which had neglected its self-ascribed 
obligations, increasing the depredations of marginal regions through squabbles 
between elite lineages in the matter of a royal succession. A revolutionary movement 
such as the Nyabingi spirit-possession cult could not have existed without a common 
core of ideals projected from the court, which actors at the periphery had 
contractually accepted. It is the violation of the court's public contract that then 
provoked a revolution in the form of the Nyabingi spirit-possession cult. 
In its time, the Nyabingi cult was able to acquire a formidable amount of 
influence, including military potentiality (Des Forges Defeat 104). Animosity 
between the regions of Nyabingi's activity in the north and the central court was very 
great. Nevertheless, a revolutionary movement need not equate to a bloody civil war. 
The court military power, though still more formidable, was unable to completely 
crush the revolt without intervention on the part of Germany (Des Forges Defeat 
107). While it is not possible to see the Nyabingi revolt in the light of a peaceful or 
nonviolent protest or resistance movement, it is conceivable that the revolt could 
have led to internal societal change, given the strength of local grievances against the 
court and the amount of organization and influence that the movement accrued. 
Along with Mamdani, I contrast the Nyabingi revolt favorably against the 
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animosities of the 1959 Revolution, charged as they were with Eurocentric racial 
ideas of intrinsic difference between Hutu and Tutsi, as well as erroneous ideas of 
Tutsi as foreigners, immigrants, or an internal “Other.” Yet this favorable contrast of 
the precolonial revolt should not suggest an atavistic return to premodern modes of 
discourse as a remedy for present social conflicts. The rituals and myths in this thesis 
function as points of discourse that allow for clear translation into a Western 
academic idiom that enables favorable comparison to the 1959 Revolution. This is an 
important point, in that the 1959 Revolution utilized Western modes of 
implementation, including radio and printed publications. 
This thesis is heavily indebted to the theories of Bruce Lincoln on the 
political utility or implications—conservative as well as revolutionary—of both myth 
and ritual. The theories that I have applied in this thesis are those Lincoln sets forth 
in Discourse and the Construction of Society. Lincoln begins by discussing myth and 
ritual as vehicles that contain the taxonomies necessary to order society according to 
a preferred vision. Lincoln defines taxonomies as follows: 
 
For the most part taxonomies are regarded—and announce themselves—as systems of 
classifying the phenomenal world, systems through which otherwise indiscriminate data 
can be organized in a form wherein they become knowable....Taxonomy is thus not only 
an epistemological instrument (a means for organizing information), but it is also (as it 
comes to organize the organizers) an instrument for the construction of society. And to 
the extent that taxonomies are socially determined, hegemonic taxonomies will tend to 
reproduce the same hierarchic system of which they are themselves the product. Within 
any society, nonetheless, there exist countertaxonomic discourses as well...: Alternative 
models whereby members of subordinate strata and others marginalized under the 
existing social order are able to agitate for the deconstruction of that order and the 
reconstruction of society on a novel pattern (7,8). 
For Lincoln, the taxonomies that myths and ritual encode and legitimate also have an 
ideological orientation, based on who is propagating a taxonomy and what the 
interest of that person or persons is. Lincoln defines “myth” as “that small class of 
10 
 
 
stories that possess both credibility and authority....[M]yth is not just a coding device 
in which important information is conveyed, on the basis of which actors can then 
construct society. It is also a discursive act through which actors evoke the 
sentiments out of which society is actively constructed” (24). 
Lincoln emphasizes the role of force and authority in his theoretical 
frameworks of the construction of society (3-11). The role of force plays an 
important part in the subject of this work. Resistance emerged in the context of an 
attempt at hegemonic occupation by a central authority. In this context, it is possible 
to radically change the discussion on violence in Rwanda's history, as this militant 
response was part of a political movement that sought local authority where 
otherwise the monopoly of violence favored centralization. Thus it is possible to 
argue that the Nyabingi movement utilized force as a necessary means of securing 
wider political rights within their marginalized sociopolitical context. 
Throughout my thesis, I will demonstrate that ritual and myth played just such 
an organizing function in precolonial Rwandan society. Not only did the myths of 
origins legitimate court power (the authority of the “Tutsi” over the “Hutu” in the 
central or peripheral regions); this court culture also had rituals that posited a 
reciprocal relationship between the king and the “Hutu,” whose benefactor the rituals 
of the court purported the king to be. Not only this, but in the rituals of spirit-
possession cults such as the well- known Nyabingi cult, we see the “Hutu” making 
claims of legitimacy to sovereign power against the court. To do this, leaders of the 
cult used the very logic of the court against a monarchy that had undermined court 
regulations of succession.  The examples I have selected show that precolonial 
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Rwandan religion was not static but highly contingent. Within the parameters of the 
oral tradition, Rwandan leaders were able to give legitimacy as needed to institutions 
that defined and challenged Rwandan society as a whole. I emphasize “as a whole” 
because while it was the rhetoric and objective of the central court to bring peripheral 
regions under a greater degree of influence, the evidence I provide suggests people in 
these regions to some degree accepted the logic of the court and used that very logic 
to express their own power and stage moments of resistance. I wish to show by 
emphasizing this wholeness of the complex and variable precolonial society that more 
recent colonial taxonomies do not reflect the truth when they have suggested one of 
the groups (of “Hutu” or “Tutsi”) is “native” or “foreign” or even of being in a 
position of natural advantage historically through establishing a functional political 
body. While it is interesting to some extent that Rwandans shared certain religious 
symbols and practices whether Hutu or Tutsi, what is both more interesting and more 
meaningful is how and why actors activated or invoked certain symbols. The 
Nyabingi movement utilized force as it had no other means of litigating against the 
injustices the central court perpetrated against their region. 
Of equal importance to the framework of this thesis is the conflicted nature of 
Rwanda's history. Scholarly histories of Rwanda tend to vindicate the group holding 
power at the time, thereby creating an optimistic impression of the contemporary 
administration. This has nonetheless tended to overlook the importance of the 
opposite group to the country's history and culture, almost to the extent of 
disregarding the exclusion of the other group from power that has tended to 
accompany each administration.  This thesis reverses this trend in the historiography.  
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There must be abasis for discussing Rwandan history and culture, particularly the 
often-ignored precolonial history, in a way that underscores the relevance and 
activity of each group in creating a society. Only when scholars begin to take 
seriously this necessary premise for Rwandan historiography can works on Rwanda 
do justice to the historical context of both groups.  Each chapter of the thesis 
examines a different institution of precolonial religion.  In chapter 1, I discuss origin 
myths that take a court-centered view in illustrating the arrangement of society. In 
chapter 2, I look at the First Fruits ceremony as an important gesture by the court of 
the mythical reciprocity between the king and the Hutu.  In chapter 3, I discuss the 
Nyabingi spirit-possession cults that challenged court authority on behalf of the Hutu, 
using the logic of court succession against a specific king. Through the discussion of 
these points of precolonial religion, I will show that precolonial Rwandan society 
was essentially plural but also demonstrated a unified culture of discursive religious 
practices and symbols, as demonstrated by the remarkably shared presuppositions 
about Rwandan society in the religious culture. Rather than a country of long-
standing ethnic hatred and warfare, there was a dynamic of distinctly African 
religiosity wrestling with the same issues of the diversity and unity of peoples that 
one sees in common African religious forms of ancestor veneration and the belief in 
a high creator god. Incidentally, this same tension between unity and diversity comes 
through in spectacularly unsuccessful European forms in the racialized view of 
human societies. As Mamdani, Des Forges, Linden and Linden, among others, have 
demonstrated, it is this Eurocentric view of the local society that really drew Rwanda 
into a disastrous polarization. 
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Methodology 
 
 
This thesis takes data from precolonial Rwandan religion and applies theory to 
assess them as taxonomizers within sociopolitical processes. From then it becomes 
possible to get a sense of the sociopolitical climate within precolonial Rwanda, but more 
importantly how Rwandan actors saw both themselves and the “Other” within the 
emerging kingdom. This process has involved the selection of certain data that were 
indicative of the divisions that area scholarship shows to have existed in the relevant 
period of history. In particular, the data that I selected, along with the accompanying 
sociological and cultural evidence, lend support to my argument that precolonial 
Rwandans shared several cultural features and that these cultural ideas and self- 
representations were in dialogue between the center and the periphery, relevant to 
illustrating constructions of social hierarchy, legitimations of power, and challenges to it. 
The myths and rituals I discuss illustrate a dynamic society—not to be simplistically 
described as “cohesive” or “functional”—that was nevertheless a contested sphere 
between a local center of power and imperfectly incorporated people that drew from the 
center for their own local identity, as well as asserting local cultural features against the 
center.  My intent has been to illustrate with this approach the lingering impact of 
colonial terms (“Tutsi” and “Hutu”) on the view of history that persists in area 
scholarship, as well as to set up a groundwork for changing the discussion of ethnicity 
surrounding Rwanda today. 
The context for discussing precolonial Rwandan culture so as to re-evaluate the 
interpretation of scholars of the instances that they studied is the growing awareness that 
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we have of the impact of colonialism on Western understanding of Rwandan history and 
culture. This has been a process that has continued to develop and complexify our 
understanding of Rwanda, as well as of the depth of the impact of colonialism.  There is 
no sense of the negative impact of colonialism in the Catholic triumphalist histories of 
Rwanda produced in the 1930s, and only a growing sense of its influences in the 
anthropology of the 1960s and 1970s. Through this process, it has come to be established 
that the terms “Tutsi” and “Hutu” in their usage from independence on are a legacy of the 
colonial era. This creates a premise for re-examining the precolonial era as a time when 
these terms were not the salient political or cultural distinctions between groups that 
nevertheless were intermittently in conflict. 
Given my distance from the subjects I study in this thesis, in terms of both time in 
history and place in geography, as well as my lack of first-hand familiarity with these 
cultural forms, it has become necessary to supplement theories for the role these myths 
and rituals played in Rwanda based on my reading of Rwandan precolonial society and 
culture. My examples have been primarily taken second-hand from academic sources, 
rather than from Rwandan sources, as would be more appropriate if these sources were 
accessible to me.  To mitigate this weakness in the examples of discourse that I have 
used, I have strived everywhere to remain cognizant of the bias of the sources I have 
used. As I discuss in my literature review, this includes the tendency over time of 
Western sources to favor local regional perspectives over central court perspectives. 
There has been the growing sense that these more local voices should receive preference 
in terms of what communities had to say about themselves, rather than what their more 
powerful “rulers” had to say about them.  Also, I have attempted to assess each source in 
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terms of its political trajectory—a prospect that has become more realizable through time, 
as hindsight has revealed a tendency even in scholarship to favor one side in the nominal 
“Tutsi”/ “Hutu” conflict over the other. The tendency that I, as an outsider to Rwandan 
politics, take to this study is one of representing the groups that have not had the same 
access to power as those in positions of leadership. This is true for the discussion of 
religious practices in the precolonial era, just as it is for the approach I take to Rwandan 
politics of the present day. It may be argued that I have not dealt sufficiently with the 
colonial period by not including a chapter dedicated solely to this crucial period of 
Rwandan history. However, I have shown throughout each chapter how the impact of 
colonization reformed, distorted, or otherwise forcibly changed the society for which 
Rwandans contended, as well as altering the taxonomies to fit Eurocentric systems. 
A second trend I have attempted to mitigate is that of Western scholarship to 
implicitly support the contemporary power structure in Rwanda by providing naturalistic 
explanations as to how a given party came to power. While this aims at satisfying 
historical questions, the tendency of this approach is to normalize power, as though the 
state of affairs in the present should not be subject to criticism. My discussion of 
precolonial religion is critical of the legitimacy of central court claims to authority over 
peripheral regions, even while I discuss how court ideas served as a point of reference in 
certain revolutionary discourses at the periphery. Thus, precolonial Rwandan culture was 
profoundly contested, even as it defined simplistic boundaries that normally appear in 
scholarly discussions of conflict between “Hutu” and “Tutsi”. In this way, my approach 
allows for legitimacy of “Tutsi” as well as “Hutu” politics in the present, even while 
contesting the application of the use of these “ethnic” terms in precolonial history.  I have 
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included, to as great a degree as I have been able, scholarly sources from Rwandans 
themselves in addition to my predominantly European or Western source base. It 
remains true that the most readily available scholarship—which demands attention—was 
from Western sources, many of whom worked directly in and with Rwandans as they 
produced their analyses. 
This question is urgent for the present, as I show in the Epilogue. The question of 
whether or not the moratorium on the use of the terms “Tutsi” and “Hutu” really leads to 
a “post-ethnic” Rwanda is profoundly disputed in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. In 
the Epilogue I look primarily to online sources to determine the nature of the discourse 
surrounding the moratorium and the related issue of President Paul Kagame’s approach to 
oppositional politics.  My approach to understanding Rwandan politics today, and how 
that climate reflects on the discursive conflict between political positions is 
socioeconomic, political, and cultural, which is the approach that I have taken throughout 
the thesis.  I have selected this approach primarily because these issues have seemed to 
me to be the most relevant to discussing and assessing changes in the way internal 
conflicts have emerged through time.  The socioeconomic relationship between 
precolonial “Hutu” and “Tutsi,” insofar as these terms reflected a cultural reality, is 
perhaps the most widely commented on distinction from that era; this is not the same as 
the cultural controversy surrounding kingship that emerged in the late nineteenth century 
and that provoked the Nyabingi revolt I discuss in chapter 3. In this context, distinctions 
of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” are relevant only broadly, in making the regional or economic 
distinctions that are still helpful, but that do not take us all the way toward understanding 
the entire nature of the revolutionary movements.  In the same way, the moratorium on 
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“Hutu” and “Tutsi” and proliferation of “genocide ideology” as facets of political 
discourse at the present time are distinct from the socioeconomic issues of 
decentralization and the embracing of neoliberal market programs.  I do not see it as 
being essential to prioritize cultural over socioeconomic issues for the precolonial and 
present contexts, or vice versa. Each context is recognizably different, though they share 
certain facets, and must be taken on its own terms. It has been relevant in either case to 
give time to socioeconomic considerations, as well as the relevant cultural and political, 
which, though not identical, are also not ultimately able to be taken in isolation. 
Throughout the thesis, issues that I defined as being relevant to discussions of 
class and culture have not included crucial issues relevant to issues of gender, for the 
most part.  In particular, this under-representation is present in the chapter on the 
Nyabingi cult, which was notable for being a hierarchy of which women were the head. 
This is representative of much of the scholarly work that was available to me, which has 
tended throughout to focus on Nyabingi as a political, regional, and class rebellion, when 
these sources have focused on it as a social phenomenon. I have, however, included 
relevant analysis of the interpretation of the gender dimension from Elizabeth Hopkins, 
whose emphasis in discussing the cult was as a political revolt against the central court 
and later against colonization.  Hopkins has described the matter of women’s leadership 
as having an unintended influence in the realm of subverting patriarchal structures of the 
local region. I have added to this that the importance of women’s leadership in this case 
emerged from the local and central cultures, and thus had contextual relevance in 
resistance to and valorization of established forms, even while this supplied the important 
psychological effect that Hopkins discusses.  There is the opportunity for further work in 
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the discussion of gender issues in this and other contexts in precolonial Rwandan studies. 
 
Where I have given my own interpretations on elements within the Rwandan or 
other myths or rituals, I have gone only so far as discussing what I see as being clearly 
true, though it is either not self-evident, or is worth explicating for the purposes of 
completing the argument. Though I have not had access to first-hand sources or a 
knowledge of the language, the interpretations in this thesis are all justified through the 
evidence that I supply from the sociological and cultural data available. If my 
interpretations are incorrect, it remains for evidence to demonstrate that they are so. 
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Literature Review: A Shift in Focus from the Center to the Periphery, and a 
Growing Awareness of the Impact of Colonization 
 
 
This chapter provides a brief overview of the developments in Rwanda 
scholarship provided by scholars who relied on oral sources.  Rwandan historiography 
has seen two major trends. It has witnessed a movement away from court-centered 
histories in favor of regional analyses.  Secondly, scholarship by Westerners has tended 
to support the established power structure in the country, from colonization. The works 
tended to locate the polarization of ethnic groups during the precolonial kingdom, under 
the Tutsi leadership. Since the 1994 takeover by the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) that effectively put an end to the genocide, research has usually supported Tutsi 
leadership, citing colonization as the origin of polarization. In terms of periodization, 
Rwandan historiography has wrestled with the cultural rupture with the past that 
colonialism caused. This gradual movement toward a regional focus, more correctly 
reflects the power distribution in the country prior to the nineteenth century. The early 
scholarship (early to mid-twentieth century) created the impression of a strong central 
kingdom with a victorious army and adept leadership of the Tutsi court, later scholarship 
began to dismantle the picture of a hypercompetent central court. Scholarship that came 
afterward took this a step further by emphasizing the local history of peripheral regions 
that exerted considerable autonomy. These regions came to receive treatment as 
independent from the court itself and interesting in their own right. I contend that this 
scholarship has exploded a simplistic, hierarchic dichotomy for Hutu and Tutsi ethnicities 
that colonialism and Eurocentric racial taxonomies introduced.  The scholarly work on 
the precolonial era thus sets up a basis for discussing Rwandan society in that time as 
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dynamic and socially constructed. 
 
In the course of this literature review, I will discuss how the histories of Rwanda 
have represented Rwandan religion.  Scholarly histories of Rwandan religion have 
focused on Christianity; in the pre-independence era, this meant projecting Christian 
antecedents onto the past, as a way of justifying European influence over the religion of 
the country. Beginning with the work of Jacques Maquet, in the 1950s, histories of 
precolonial religion took on a functional approach that cut the ties between scholarship 
on Rwandan religion and missionary interests, yet did little to challenge the court- 
centered status quo. In this model, the divine king was the apex of a religious power 
structure, with ancestor-veneration serving to unite the kingdom culturally from the top 
of the hierarchy down. Jan Vansina's groundbreaking work with Rwandan oral history 
reflected disparities of power and conflicts between the center and the margin, thus 
creating a basis for a dynamic and sociopolitical approach to divine kingship, ancestor- 
veneration, and spirit-possession cults. Scholars who would carry on this approach to 
Rwandan religious history include David Newbury, Iris Berger, and Alison Des Forges, 
among others. The poststructuralist critique of Rwandan historiography becomes 
predominant following the 1994 genocide and Tutsi ascendancy. This approach enables 
Mahmood Mamdani and Timothy Longman to look at Christianity as a catalyst for re- 
organizing Rwandan society according to a Eurocentric model. Earlier works by Alison 
Des Forges and Ian and Jane Linden serve as essential precursors to these studies. There 
has been less work on precolonial religion in the years since the genocide than there was 
before. One sees how the conceptualizations about Rwandan religion have also served to 
support contemporary power structures.  With this literature review and the remainder of 
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the thesis, I suggest that looking into Rwanda's precolonial religion is a necessary 
corrective to approaches that support the claims to power of one group at the expense of 
the other. Precolonial Rwandan religion was a shared culture of symbols that both 
supported and challenged a complex and diversified power structure. 
At this point, it is necessary for me to acknowledge that I do not speak French, 
which is the language in which many key scholarly publications on Rwanda were first 
printed. In some cases, French is the only medium in which these sources exist. The 
earliest histories, including those of Alexis Kagame and Louis de Lacger, and later works 
by Marcel d'Hertefelt, were thus unavailable to me; I have had to discuss their reputation 
and influence using second-hand sources. 
Written histories of Rwanda first appeared as written texts while the country was 
under Belgian control, in the 1930s.  These histories portrayed Rwanda as a country 
whose past served as a local Old Testament, and whose future appeared as a golden age 
with the coming of European rulers and the missions of the Catholic Church. Linden and 
Linden (1977) identify the earliest written histories with the ideology of colonial rule 
along with its racist presuppositions, derived primarily from minor evolutionary 
sociologists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Linden and Linden 1). Many 
such works were collaborations with Christian doctrine, attempting to reconcile apparent 
discrepancies between church histories and the findings of science. These early histories 
include, on the Europeans' side, Pages' Un Royaume hamite au centre de l'Afrique (1933) 
and de Lacger's Le Ruanda (1939). Both men were Catholic clergy. These works 
promoted the role of Catholicism in elevating the status of Rwandans, whose potential for 
development and progress the white men linked to the Caucasian origins of the Tutsi. In 
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the same vein, although coming from the perspective of the Rwandan elite, were the 
publications of Alexis Kagame, a Catholic cleric who came from a family of court 
historians. Kagame's aim was to support the role of the Catholic Church in the further 
development of the country, as well as to celebrate the power and longevity of the Tutsi 
court. This included supporting the claims of European anthropology that the Tutsi 
originated as a superior stock from a different region of Africa (usually identified with 
Ethiopia). This allegedly made the Tutsi armies victorious over the “Bantu” natives, the 
Tutsi government comprehensively functional as well as sufficiently benevolent to create 
amicable relations between the rulers and the ruled. Kagame's work marks the earliest 
history in support of a Rwandan nationalism embracing Western influence (Linden and 
Linden 5). While the compromise between court and Catholic politics has traditionally 
dominated the discussion of Kagame’s scholarship in Western sources, including 
prominently Jan Vansina and Ian and Jane Linden, Kagame’s importance in preserving 
the oral tradition for later study is very great. Rose-Marie Mukarutabana has stated that 
Kagame remains “the undisputed leader in Rwandan Studies,” producing a quantity of 
work including both aristocratic as well as popular forms of oral literature, which served 
as the basis for later studies. Mukarutabana asserts that the Rwandan oral literature 
remains largely unexplored in area scholarship (“Introduction” pg. 16). 
The earliest histories on Rwanda by Western academics contributed to 
dismantling the triumphalist picture of the earlier church histories. The works that I 
focus on here are Jean-Jacques Maquet's Le Système des relations sociales dans le 
Rwanda ancien (1954), Jan Vansina's L'évolution du royaume rwanda des origines à 
1900 (1961), and Marcel d'Hertefelt's Les clans du Rwanda ancien: éléments 
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d'ethnosociologie et d'ethnohistoire (1971). Beginning with Vansina, each work built on 
what had come before to push Rwanda historiography in the direction of a regional focus, 
rather than a court-centered focus. Maquet set out to establish that Rwanda existed as a 
cohesive, stratified society prior to colonial intervention. Maquet gave what was for the 
time the definitive exploration of the system of cattle clientship that was the basis for the 
economy of the precolonial kingdom. On the basis of the occupational stereotypes (in 
which Tutsi function as herders of cattle and Hutu as agriculturalists), Maquet envisioned 
a harmonious but unequal system with ethnic distinctions representing caste differences. 
Jan Vansina reconstructed precolonial Rwandan history from oral tradition in a 
way that radically challenged the previous histories (including Maquet's), all of which left 
the court-centered model of history basically intact. Vansina shortened the longevity of 
the court by several hundred years by challenging the historicity of several monarchs  
with actions contained in court myth. He further questioned the superiority of the central 
armies by arguing that in many cases conquests came as the result of favorable 
circumstances, beyond their own or their adversaries' control. He also demonstrated that 
the inequalities of the precolonial system were not functional and harmonious to the 
extent that Kagame and Maquet had earlier asserted. Vansina's work was the result of 
political circumstances of his time. His book's publication in 1961 came right in the 
middle of Rwanda's social revolution, in which representatives of Hutu ethnicity came to 
power by majority vote (C. Newbury Cohesion, xiii). Hence, Vansina reconstructed a 
version of Rwandan history contrary to Tutsi court histories to demonstrate that the 
Hutu's social revolution had considerable historical justification. In doing so, Vansina 
repeatedly asserted, in his work, that Hutu and Tutsi had become politically polarized 
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identities prior to colonialism. Vansina's emphasis has overwhelmingly on military 
action in the country to the purpose of expanding court power and centralizing authority 
into the hands of the nobility. 
The work of Marcel d'Hertefelt offers further corrective by emphasizing cohesion 
and fluidity across ethnic boundaries that previous historians had always portrayed as 
closed (Linden and Linden, 6). De Lacger's work had also demonstrated the existence of 
social mobility prior to colonialism that upended the myth of precolonial “castes” 
(Linden and Linden 6; C. Newbury Cohesion 12, 13). Instead of cattle clientship, which 
Vansina demonstrated to be oppressive to poorer classes of farmers, d'Hertefelt 
emphasized multi-ethnic clans as creating regional stability and cohesion, as well as a 
shared kinship identity. Finding that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa all shared a clan identity led 
d'Hertefelt to draw his conclusions that Hutu and Tutsi were in fact class identities that 
carried with them the sense of social mobility (Linden and Linden 6). From this premise, 
it became possible to discard the idea that Hutu and Tutsi had separate origins or were 
radically distinct groups before colonization. 
In his discussion of Rwandan historiography, David Newbury has argued that the 
these works greatly influenced Rwandan scholarship by removing the focus from the 
court and encouraging a broadening of ethnography to focus on regional traditions and 
histories. The works in this vein of research include, according to Newbury, studies by 
Helen Codere, Claudine Vidal, Jim Freedman, and Pierre Gravel, in addition to the works 
of David and Catharine Newbury (“Kivu” 45). Along with this de-emphasis on court 
tradition, scholarship emerging in the 1970s was acutely conscious of the collaboration of 
court and colonial power and of its influence over the early histories.  Alison Des Forges' 
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Defeat is the Only Bad News and Ian and Jane Linden's Church and Revolution in 
Rwanda were among the foremost from this era of scholarship in attempting to trace the 
effects of this alliance. The image they portray of the kingship of Musinga, the last non- 
Christian king of Rwanda, was one of steady increase over a period of roughly three 
decades (ca. 1900-1930) of colonial control over Rwandan political life. 
Following two revolutions in the 1960s, the subject of recurring violence became 
the object of study.  Works by Rene Lemarchand and Jean-Pierre Chretien sought to 
dispel misconceptions about the “tribal” nature of area violence in the Great Lakes 
Region, including the genocide of Hutus by Tutsis in Burundi in the early 1970s. As 
Lemarchand states in Burundi, “Not atavistic hatreds, but something closer to what 
Benedict Anderson calls 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1991) lie behind the litany of 
horrors chronicled by the media” (xii). Beginning in the 1970s, scholarship has come 
increasingly to recognize the constructed nature of Hutu and Tutsi identities and their 
recent origin. This has drawn attention, in turn, to the role of the central court and their 
colonial collaborators in creating and imposing these designations on the population. The 
groundwork done in the 1970s and 80s has informed the scholarship that in recent years 
has sought to make sense of the violence of 1994, as Rwanda moves beyond the 
genocide. Key to this new understanding has been the re-definition of ethnicity contained 
in these works. Their formation in the precolonial kingdom through the expansion and 
centralization of the court and their conversion into caste identities under colonialism 
must serve as the basis for any historical understanding of Hutu and Tutsi. 
The study of the precolonial era, including precolonial religion, enjoyed an era of 
relative dominance in the 1970s and '80s.  Works by David and Catherine Newbury, Iris 
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Berger, Jim Freedman, and Elizabeth Hopkins took into account the dynamics of power, 
cohesion, and resistance as they employed religious symbols and justification from the 
broader cultural context. David Newbury saw rituals of divine kingship as methods 
whereby the court justified its power over bordering regions as a necessary religious 
sanction to the prosperity of those regions (“Kingship”).  Jim Freedman saw the 
reclaiming of local history at work in the litanies of the Nyabingi spirit-possession cults 
(170, 171), while Elizabeth Hopkins noted the promise of liberation from Tutsi leadership 
the cult offered Hutu (275). The work of these scholars has furthered a complex, 
differentiated, and dynamic view of precolonial religiosity as function of sociopolitical 
realities. 
Following 1994, scholarship has discussed genocidal violence in its international 
context. This research looks both at the colonial history of the country and the inattention 
of Western countries in the United Nations and the United States to warnings that 
violence was imminent or under way in the country. Peter Uvin (Aiding Violence, 1998) 
argues that the aid of Western countries did not lead to development, as the resources 
provided supported discriminatory institutions and ultimately supported the regime that 
perpetrated the genocide. Mahmood Mamdani (When Victims Become Killers, 2001) has 
assessed the events of the genocide as a product of colonial shaping of national identities, 
with Tutsi as “settlers” and Hutu as “natives.” Timothy Longman (Christianity and 
Genocide in Rwanda, 2010) has examined the continued connection between Christian 
churches and the Rwandan establishment and the role of churches and clergy in helping 
to orchestrate the genocide. During this most recent period, work on precolonial religion 
has become scarce, as discussion of the precolonial legacy of Christianity and Indirect 
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Rule has become more prominent. 
 
In The Debris of Ham, Aimable Twagilimana has made inroads to discussing 
postcolonial conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi in a regional context. In particular, 
Twagilimana emphasizes the revolution of 1973 that began the Second Republic as a 
regional conflict between factions both typically designated as Hutu. Twagilimana has 
shown that in this revolution, the movement by the north against the south was a reprisal 
of precolonial regional antagonism, even as it took its particular political context from the 
influences of colonization, in particular the Hamitic Hypothesis. Both Tutsi and Hutu 
comprised the political body of the south that suffered defeat in this revolution. 
Twagilimana’s work stands as an important point of departure for future scholarship to 
continue to problematize the standard Western concept of Rwanda’s internal conflicts as 
primarily between “Hutu” and “Tutsi.” Former Speaker of the Rwandan Parliament and 
author of God Sleeps in Rwanda Joseph Sebarenzi is a Tutsi and critic of the RPF 
administration who has spoken in defense of imprisoned presidential candidate Victoire 
Ingabire Umuhosa, a Hutu. President Kagame personally insisted on Sebarenzi’s 
resignation when he refused to comply to a bill Kagame wanted to pass (“Justice” 346). 
Sebarenzi parallels Twagilimana’s view about not hardening postcolonial conflicts into 
simple dichotomies of “Hutu” against “Tutsi.” Sebarenzi states, “The truth is that 
Rwanda is run by an inner circle of Tutsi led by President Kagame,” (“Justice” 348). 
Future scholarship in Rwanda must continue to nuance the understanding of 
ethnicity that has emerged as the result of the last five decades of scholarship, and 
scholars should seek to employ nuanced definitions of Hutu and Tutsi in public discourse. 
It is also necessary for Rwanda scholarship to continue to assess Rwanda in its 
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international context.  Isolating the country as an academic topic will lead to its isolation 
in the sphere of politics as well. Today, Rwandan power involves the suppression of 
criticism of the government (Straus, Waldorf 4). By opening the topic of ethnicity for 
discussion, the chance for vindication of oppositional politics becomes more likely. In 
this thesis, I have tried to contribute to this process by discussing Hutu and Tutsi 
identities in their precolonial context and to connect the interaction between divine 
kingship and spirit-possession movements to Rwanda's present struggle to maintain self- 
determinacy as it receives widening international attention. I conclude by calling for 
renewed work in the area of the precolonial religion, as my own thesis seeks to show how 
religious institutions and practices reflect a commonality of symbols that actors used to 
reinforce or challenge the status quo; the conflicts themselves are equaled by the shared 
religious ideation that invoked sentiment and motivated action. 
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Chapter 1: Kigwa’s Three Sons: Court Construction of Precolonial Society 
 
 
In this chapter, I demonstrate that the original identities of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” 
developed in direct response to an emerging elite culture. In effect, “Tutsi” were court 
members, its representatives, or those who otherwise belonged to families that 
exemplified the elite culture of the central court. “Hutu” referred to geographical or 
political outsiders and servants.  In the precolonial kingdom, the dichotomy between 
these identities was seen in regard to military participation, to geographical residence, 
and to material wealth, which carried with it the understanding of inclusion in central 
court politics. These three dichotomies by which Hutu and Tutsi were distinguished are, 
of course, not identical. Nor were identities of Hutu and Tutsi rigidly fixed according to 
any uniform standard for differentiating them. The difference between Hutu and Tutsi 
was neither racial, nor tribal, as some have asserted; in addition to the geographical and 
political contexts, the distinction in terms designated merit based on the norms set by the 
central court, especially focusing on values of self-mastery and responsibility, interpreted 
as a potential for leadership. The physical stereotypes according to which Tutsi came to 
mean tall and thin while Hutu came to mean broad and of medium height, were soft 
generalizations in the precolonial kingdom (Maquet Inequality 145, 146). During the 
colonial period, the physical stereotypes of the Tutsi came to signify, according to 
Western anthropological taxonomies, the Caucasian racial element that the Tutsi 
supposedly carried. The physical stereotype of the Hutu was supposed to have signified 
their Bantu or “true negro” racial essence. This change effectively recast Rwandan 
physical stereotypes in the biological hierarchy prescribed by European race theory. I 
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will demonstrate the difference between the functioning of the taxonomies in Rwandan 
mythology from those of European mythology by drawing a contrast between relevant 
Rwandan and European myths. 
The royal myths of Rwanda record the actions of the original king, Kigwa, who 
descended to earth from heaven at a time in Rwanda’s earliest history. Mukarutabana 
notes that the kings belonging to the earliest time period in the genealogies 
are not really individualzed rulers, but symbolic names descriptive of the successive 
development processes of the first two great periods of Mankind’s early history. The 
mythological accounts for these two periods is therefore pretty much reduced to the story of 
the founders of these dynasties (“The Royal Myths” pg. 3). 
 
Mahmood Mamdani cites the following myths as a representation of how Rwandans 
thought of Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa; Mamdani draws these from sources published from 
court informants in the early twentieth century. Thus, the effect of the myths is to place 
the three social categories in differing proximity to kingship, which Kigwa represents in 
the first myth. The divine aspect of the monarch appears as the god Imana in the second. 
The first myth runs as follows: 
Kigwa's three sons—Gatwa, Gahutu, and Gatutsi—were said to be deprived of a social 
faculty. One day Gatutsi, the firstborn, suggested that they go to Imana (God) and ask for a 
social faculty. Gatutsi went first, and Imana offered him the faculty of anger. When Gahutu 
arrived, Imana let him know that only the faculty of disobedience and labor was left, and 
Gahutu agreed to accept it. Gatwa was the last to arrive and was offered the only remaining 
faculty, gluttony, which he gladly embraced (79). 
 
The second myth runs as follows: 
 
To test the ability of his three sons—Gatwa, Gahutu, and Gatutsi—Kigwa carried out an 
experiment.  Entrusting each of his sons with a calabash filled with milk, he told them to 
watch over it for a night. The morning after, Gatwa was found to have drunk all the milk, and 
Gahutu to have spilled his; only Gatutsi had kept his milk intact.  So, the king entrusted 
Gatutsi to command the glutton serf Gatwa and the clumsy peasant Gahutu (80). 
Mamdani outlined the above court myths to illustrate their obvious usage in legitimating 
a social hierarchy within the kingdom.  Mahmood Mamdani elsewhere discusses the 
myth in Kigwa and the progenitors of the royal Abanyaginya and Abega clans descend to 
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Rwanda from heaven. This myth suggests yet another degree of stratification, by which 
the foremost royal clans were held to have been superior to ordinary Tutsi (79). Maquet 
has also noted that a number of myths from Rwandan traditions discuss the original 
coming of the Tutsi to Rwanda, which tends to lend credibility to the theory that social 
stratification proceeded in some relationship from migration (Maquet “Kingdom” 174). 
Nigel Eltringham maintains that the descent-from-heaven myths also maintain clan and 
royal authority, rather than any such hard divisions as race or ethnicity (“ 'Invaders' ” 
432). 
Mamdani furthermore draws comparison between these myths and the biblical 
myth of the Noahic curse of Ham.  Mamdani paraphrases the biblical myth as follows: 
The account in Genesis tells of Ham's contempt for his father [Noah], whom he saw drunk 
and lying naked in a stupor.  While Noah's other sons covered their father's nakedness, 
averting their eyes so as not to witness his shame, Ham did not look away. Noah blessed the 
descendants of Shem and Japhet, but cursed those of Ham. While Genesis says nothing about 
the descendants of Ham being black, the claim that they were cursed by being black first 
appeared in the oral traditions of the Jews when these were recorded in the sixth-century 
Babylonian Talmud; that same myth depicts Ham as a sinful man and his progeny as 
degenerates (80). 
 
Mamdani adds that this myth persisted in its racialized form through the Middle Ages and 
ultimately served as a justification of the Atlantic slave trade in the early modern period 
(81).1 Mamdani puts a positive spin on the myths I have cited above when he states that, 
“Both [the Rwandan and the biblical myths] identify social differences as differences 
between those whose ancestors were brothers, thus the differences continue to be within a 
single humanity” (81).  Mamdani contrasts this portrayal favorably in comparison with 
 
 
 
1Contrary to Mamdani's view, David M. Whitford has argued that the Noahic curse did not have a racial or 
physical connotation among early or medieval Jews or Christians. Instead, the myth justified serfdom in 
medieval European society and expanded to include African enslavement in early modern times. This 
interpretation then endured to eventually justify racial segregation in America in the twentieth century 
(Whitford 1, 2). 
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the later Hamitic hypotheses that credited the descendants of Ham, as Caucasians, with 
bringing civilization to Africa (83). Mamdani's reasoning is that earlier versions of the 
myth at least included Africans and Europeans within the same human family, whereas 
later Hamitic hypotheses imply that Africans are subhuman or radically distinct from 
Caucasians. In these formulations, only Caucasians could have brought civilization to 
Africa, because only Caucasians had the capacity for civilization. 
Mamdani's characterization of African as opposed to the European myths assumes 
two things about them. On the one hand, Mamdani recognizes, obviously, that the myths 
were not byproducts of innocent speculation, but they were the products of deliberate 
social construction whose impact was calculable and intentional. Thus he bases his 
judgment of the myths on their appreciable difference in intent, measurable by the kind of 
separation they posit between the archetypal personages.  Of course, the difference in 
what I have called intent of the myth—meaning here, in how the archetypes differ from 
one another in their comparative level of humanness—is a moot question, since what 
matters is not how myths represent people in society comparatively against other myths, 
but how those in power use myths to then treat those whom myths claim to represent. As 
Russell McCutcheon succinctly states: 
Scholars of religion in particular study the way groups manipulate such focusing devices as 
discourses on origins, endtimes, and nonobvious beings. Or, to put it another way, myths and 
rituals are mechanisms whereby groups exercise and manage what Smith terms an 'economy 
of signification.' As scholars, we therefore examine the many narrative, behavioral, and 
institutional devices groups employ to represent and contest differing conceptions of 
themselves—and to allocate access to resources based on those conceptions (15, 16). 
 
The contrast Mamdani draws between the ways in which the above myths portray the 
origins of the archetypal characters touches directly upon what McCutcheon has stated 
above.  The origin myths intentionally constructed society in a way that would then 
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determine the allocation of resources and the division of labor according to a hierarchy. 
 
A goal of scholars of religious studies has been to illuminate the ways in which 
myths are able to put everyday signifiers to work in the way that McCutcheon describes. 
The first such view of the use of physical symbols or descriptors as they appear in myth 
comes from Emile Durkheim, who stated: 
A sensation, an image is always attached to a definite object or to a collection of such objects, 
and expresses the momentary state of a particular consciousness. It is essentially individual 
and subjective. Besides, we are free to do as we like with representations that originate in this 
way. Of course, when our sensations are immediate, they impose themselves on us in fact. 
But by rights we are their masters, free to conceive of them otherwise and to picture them in a 
different order from the one in which they were produced.  Nothing binds us to them as long 
as considerations of another kind do not intervene.  So we have two sorts of knowledge that 
are like opposite poles of intelligence. Under these conditions, to reduce reason to experience 
is to conjure it away, for the universality and necessity that characterize it are reduced to pure 
appearance, illusions that can be practically useful but correspond to nothing in things 
themselves (15, 16). 
 
Durkheim's quote here is relevant because it deals with the process of the formation of 
archetypes based on existing evidence that one who hears a myth can confirm through 
personal experience. Durkheim speaks of a “sensation” or “image;” he emphasizes the 
subjectivity of the experiential image, yet myths such as the ones cited above gain 
credibility by representing something self-evident as part of a larger non-obvious (and 
essentially fictitious) system of causation. When he says, “...by rights we are their 
masters, free to conceive of them otherwise and to picture them in a different order from 
the one in which they were produced,” Durkheim shows how subjective sensations and 
images become codified as something else, incorporated into a prescription for society in 
such a way as to make the social structure appear natural or inescapable.  This refers to 
the archetypes or symbols such as the characters in the above myths, which purport to 
explain not only why the world is the way it is, but why it must remain so.  A 
groundwork for exploitation emerges within this context.  As Lincoln puts it, “Myth...'has 
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the task of giving an historical intention a natural justification, and making contingency 
appear eternal....'” (5). Thus, myth constructs society in such a way that replaces 
subjectively or otherwise value-laden signifiers with taxonomic value according to a 
social hierarchy, thereby creating a leverage for social control. 
The second of Mamdani's assumptions, and the one with which I am in 
disagreement, is that the myths cited above—one from Rwanda's oral tradition (the sons 
of Kigwa), one biblical (the Curse of Noah), one emerging in the modern era with the 
European Enlightenment (the Hamitic hypotheses)—functioned to construct society in  
the same kind of way. Without venturing from a conceptualization of myth that allows us 
to classify the three above together in one sense—a sense in which, to quote Geertz, we 
see myths employ symbols “to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and 
motivations...by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence,” with the 
purpose of organizing society—I argue that a qualitative difference exists between the 
Rwandan traditional myths and the European myths that Mamdani has not acknowledged 
(90). The difference between the European and Rwandan myths centers on how the two 
myths taxonomize the members of the societies they purport to represent, as well as the 
medium the separate mythologies utilize to express the relevant distinctions. 
Bruce Lincoln defines “taxonomizers” as components of myth, of which “each 
one establishes the basis for an act of discrimination through which all members of a 
given class are assigned to one of two [or more] subclasses: those who possess the trait or 
property in question and those who do not” (133). Lincoln goes on to say that such 
taxonomizers serve as the basis for “the logical structure whereby social hierarchies are 
recorded....”(133)  When we look to the aforementioned myths for their taxonomizers, or 
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their bases for classifying people into different groups, we find that the myths have 
serious differences in their classificatory agendas. 
I propose first to discuss the European myths, not as separate entities, but as part 
of the same taxonomy of races, in which Europeans sought to establish themselves as 
superior to and natural masters of the Africans. Neither the biblical myth of the Noahic 
curse nor the pseudo-scientific myth of Hamitic migrations credits Africans with the 
innate ability to govern themselves or to build civilizations.  The emergence of the 
second category, the Hamitic migration theories, was a stopgap reworking of earlier 
Noahic versions that Europeans used to account for the accumulation of vast amounts of 
data contradicting the assumption that blacks were unable to civilize. If the Hamitic 
theories accord more credit to Africans than did the Noahic curse myths, this was a 
matter of answering for data that was not refutable; it does not reflect a change in intent 
on the part of European taxonomizers. The alterations they made were in fact nakedly 
self-serving: Caucasians explained the growth of civilizations in Africa by theorizing that 
some Cauasians (whom they called “Hamites”) must have intermarried with Africans at a 
time in the distant past (Mamdani 82, 83).2 
The taxonomizer in the myth changes from one to the next, with the biblical myth 
(in its European manifestation) reflecting the taxonomic criterion of Christianity as the 
prerequisite for civilization. Anthropological theory that emphasized races as fixed 
according to a natural hierarchy tended to be more pessimistic about the possibility of 
creating material equality among races, since they assumed non-white races could not 
 
 
2 While I have divided “Noahic curse” myths from “Hamitic migration” hypotheses, these categories are 
not without overlap. However, many or most anthropologists who had recourse to myths of Hamitic 
migration did not believe in the authority of the Bible as literal history. 
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properly manage the responsibilities attendant on possessing material wealth.3 The first 
taxonomy, since it used myths found in the Christian and Hebrew Bible, deals with the 
Christian theological question of guilt or innocence and the ability of the person to 
overcome the guilt of sin through the mediation of the Christian religion. The second 
taxonomy, often implicitly, looks to the criterion of an innate capacity or fitness that 
belonged to the Enlightenment mindset as the difficult-to-ascertain ability of human 
beings to master themselves and the natural world. To take just one example, this 
mindset appears in the words of the nineteenth century anthropologist Sir William 
Lawrence: 
The different progress of various nations in general civilization, and in the culture of the arts 
and sciences, the different characteristics and degree of excellence in their literary 
productions, their varied forms of government, and many other considerations, convince us 
beyond the possibility of doubt, that the races of mankind are no less characterised by 
diversity of mental endowments, than by...differences of...body structure....(Gossett 56) 
 
The unequal endowment of humanity's innate capacities then led, according to Social 
Darwinist thinking common in the late nineteenth century, to allegedly evolutionary 
processes of natural selection, “a struggle between individual members of a society, 
between members of classes of a society, between different nations, and between 
different races. This conflict...was nature's indispensable method for producing superior 
men, superior nations and superior races” (Gossett 145). 
Having analyzed the meanings and assumptions of European myths, I will now 
 
 
3 For an example of this distinct contrast, one can look to John Hanning Speke's Journal of the Discovery 
of the Source of the Nile and Arthur de Gobineau's The Inequality of Human Races. While both reflect 
the Eurocentric attitudes regarding race, Speke's conviction that through European leadership and, 
especially, Christianity, the difference could be overcome is markedly different from de Gobineau's view 
that only white Europeans possessed the capacity for civilization.  Although de Gobineau accepted      
the Noahic curse as history, he did not see Christianity as offering a hope for the betterment of non- 
Europeans. Mamdani's exposition of the myths does reflect a distinction between biblically derived 
versions and pseudo-anthropological versions; yet the distinction is reducible to one of cultural as 
opposed to biological essentialism. The Rwanda myths do not reflect this kind of essentialist distinction 
between Tutsi and Hutu. 
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examine the ways in which the Rwandan myths functioned. Then I will discuss the 
significant differences between the European myths and the Rwandan court myths that 
taxonomized Rwandans into three groups of people. I argue that the way in which the 
Rwandan myths functioned within Rwandan society differs from the way in which the 
European myths functioned in that society. The Rwandan taxonomizers in the origin 
myths present a hierarchy of social merits that identify self-mastery and responsibility as 
valued traits for purposes of leadership and elevated status. The European myths, on the 
other hand, invoke supposedly inherent racial qualities. On a first reading, the Rwandan 
myths appear to share the language of the European Hamitic myths, that present social 
faculties as a function of biological essence—the idea that the origin or identity (the 
characters are eponyms of the three social groups in the country) of the three sons of 
Kigwa are determinative of their abilities and status almost suggests itself. However, I 
will argue that Westerners who attempt to read these myths will approach them in a way 
that is different from how Rwandans in the precolonial kingdom would have heard them. 
The Rwandan court myths are similar to the European myths in that they propose 
hierarchical representations of society based upon taxonomic principles that are as 
fictitious as the narratives in which they are embedded. In my view, that is where the 
similarities between the two end. I will make the case for a distinct difference on the 
grounds that the court myths differed both in the intent of those who framed them and in 
the reception of those who heard. 
Perhaps the easiest place to begin expounding the difference between the 
European and Rwandan court myths is in the taxonomizers themselves. I have stated 
above that the court myths offered a hierarchical status scheme based upon merits of self- 
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mastery and responsibility, whereas other criteria served as the primary taxonomic 
indicator for the European. To reiterate what I stated in the early pages of this chapter, 
the function of myths is to take subjective, experiential data and turn them into 
meaningful symbols, which then function within holistic systems to structure society. 
The truth of the myths appears to be self-evident to the taxonomizers, which are, or 
appear to be, empirically verifiable. The Rwandan court myths differ from the European 
myths in that the taxonomizers in these myths are personality or character traits, not 
physical features. The two court myths purport to describe the same three groups of 
people, and the two myths are directly related. So I propose reading across the myths to 
ascertain the claims that these myths make about specific character traits and their 
function within society. 
The myths take the dimmest view of the Twa. The role that this archetypal 
character plays in the two myths is simple and easy to interpret. Gatwa, as the last of the 
three brothers to approach Imana, receives the last and least desirable social faculty, 
gluttony. When Imana puts Gatwa's social faculty to the test, Gatwa predictably drinks 
the entire calabash of milk. The principle at work comes through clearly. Of the social 
faculties, Gatwa's is the most self-serving and represents a failure even to maintain basic 
self-control.  Hence, Gatwa has the lowest position in the social hierarchy.  In the time 
period this thesis addresses—roughly speaking the end of the 18th to the early 20th 
 
century—Twa represented around 1% of the total population. This led to some 
marginalization of this group, although Twa who demonstrated competency could fulfill 
virtually any function within Rwandan society. In exceptional circumstances, a Twa 
could even become a patron with his own cattle (Vansina Antecedents 48).  Late in the 
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history of the kingdom, a Twa leader became one of the most feared leaders of several 
revolutionary movements that rose up in opposition to court power; needless to say, this 
is an accomplishment that would require self-discipline as well as a considerable talent 
for command (Des Forges Defeat 104).  Twa could even distinguish themselves at court 
at various times in the roles of officials, musicians/entertainers, or guards (Vansina 
Antecedents 69, 75, 102; Des Forges Defeat 84, 237). Thus, even for the group given the 
lowest regard in the myth, exceptions were recognized and allowed, even at court. Of 
course, those Twa who benefited in the cases of these exceptions would be the most 
likely to possess the faculties of self-discipline and leadership prized in the myth. This 
makes it very likely that precolonial Rwandans interpreted the myth as touching on social 
values, rather than as describing fixed or inherited traits. 
The treatment of the characters identified as Hutu and Tutsi in the myth further 
suggest a taxonomy of society with a parochial emphasis on values as opposed to a 
taxonomy of inherent traits. To Gahutu, Imana accords the social faculties of 
disobedience and labor. Of course, the myth is not trying to say that disobedience is 
superior to gluttony, thus placing Gahutu on a higher rung of the ladder than Gatwa. 
When Imana gives a calabash of milk to Gahutu, he demonstrates his lack of self- 
discipline and competence by spilling the calabash. This same lack of competency is 
what prevents Gahutu from receiving a commission of leadership from Imana. Although 
Gatutsi, according to the myth, receives a faculty of anger, we might interpret this to be a 
reference to Gatutsi's capacity for command. After all, anger is a necessary component 
for leaders to have, within measure, to use with insubordination, with enemies of the 
people whom he represents, or with work that those under his charge have done poorly. 
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Cross-referencing the two myths, we can read the faculty of anger in this light, because 
we see that it is Gatutsi who has the self-discipline to properly safeguard the calabash of 
milk with which Imana has entrusted him. Gatutsi's capacity for self-command is what 
impels Imana to entrust this son of Kigwa with leadership over his brothers. 
To support my interpretation of these court myths, I discuss Rwandan society 
during the era of centralization and expansion, an historical period lasting from the 
beginning of the eighteenth to the end of the nineteenth centuries.  This discussion 
focuses on how Hutu and Tutsi identities emerged in contrast to one another. While the 
Twa represent a third group, they are a very small percentage of the overall population of 
the country. Thus, Twa ethnic grievances have not emerged as a major element in 
Rwandan politics. The Twa population, for example, was not stereotyped in the role of 
either patron or client, as Hutu and Tutsi were, although Twa have historically received 
the stereotype of being hunters and foragers (Des Forges Defeat 4). 
The contrasting identities of Hutu and Tutsi developed in Rwanda in the context 
of centralization and expansion of the precolonial kingdom.  The terms first came into 
use at court, and through court expansion became widespread throughout the kingdom. In 
court terminology, “Hutu” and “Tutsi” were conceived of as reciprocal and hierarchical 
(Vansina Antecedents 134-139).  The sense of the command relationship  between  
Gatutsi and the other two sons of Kigwa is a partial representation of this relationship 
between  the  two  groups,  but  the  economic  structure  of  the  kingdom   carried             
mutual obligations. Through the reciprocity purported to exist through cattle clientship, 
Hutu and Tutsi were mutually dependent in a cohesive social structure in which Tutsi 
were lords or patrons and Hutu were their tenants, who worked in exchange for the use of 
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cattle and for protection (Mamdani 64-66). This normative model of society increasingly 
did not reflect the plight of the Hutu farmers in the country, a problem that came to a 
head in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as I will demonstrate in chapter 
3. 
Because the taxonomy contained in these myths represented a kind of social 
construction, the myths themselves are actively engaged in the procedures of boundary 
maintenance that delineate those of elite status from those of common status. The 
discussion of ethnic boundaries introduced by Fredrik Barth becomes relevant in this 
context “on the anomalous persons who change their ethnic identity: a discovery 
procedure aiming to lay bare the processes involved in the reproduction of ethnic groups” 
(6). Although the distinction between Hutu and Tutsi was originally one of class rather 
than one of ethnicity, Barth's work nevertheless helps to identify the nature of the 
differentiation between groups as Rwandans originally conceived them. Rene 
Lemarchand has further illustrated the importance of class in the distinction between 
groups in Rwandas neighbor to the south, Burundi. Lemarchand has discussed the 
procedures of kihutura and gutahira, Kirundi words meaning roughly social promotion or 
demotion, respectively.  Kihutura was the name given to the phenomenon whereby a 
Hutu became Tutsi; although the reverse occurring was rare, gutahira designates the fall 
of a member of the princely class to Tutsi status (8). 
The terms Hutu and Tutsi had hierarchical relevance in regard to the armies of the 
central kingdom.  I have chosen to discuss this topic first for three main reasons. The 
first is that the spread of military activity in the precolonial country was arguably the 
most important facet of life, both for the purposes of expansion and for the purposes of 
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social cohesion.  Vansina states: 
 
Armies existed to wage war. This banal truth must be underlined because the historiography 
has so much stressed their sociopolitical role as the institution that organized the population in 
peacetime that the fact that armies were tools of war tends to get overlooked. And from the 
reign of Rujugira [beginning ca. 1770] onward the country was almost continually in a state of 
war (Antecedents 75). 
 
However, I have chosen to emphasize the armies' function in providing Rwandans with a 
common identity that would last through the colonial conquest. It is also through the 
forcible unification of disparate regions that the terminology of Hutu and Tutsi became as 
widespread as it did. The second reason I emphasize the armies is that in this context the 
two terms came for the first time to describe definite groups of people according to their 
social functions: combatants were Tutsi and non-combatants, including spies, cattle 
rustlers, and menials, were Hutu (Vansina Antecedents 73-79; 134, 135).  Here one can 
see the way in which the identification of the terms with social faculties played out in 
social situations. Anger and self-discipline, the two characteristics of Tutsi according to 
the court myths, are easy to associate with the combatants in the army. Meanwhile, labor 
fell to the Hutu, whose subordinate position received a justification in that military norms 
demand self-command the Hutu did not allegedly possess. This example demonstrates a 
functional hierarchy based on the assertion that there is an ethical or character difference 
that justifies the established hierarchy.  The potential for members to pass between 
statuses within this system also receives justification from the same ethical basis. 
The third reason I emphasize the military is that the activity of the armies and 
their usage by the court directly created the other two contexts in which I discuss Hutu 
and Tutsi as classifications in Rwanda. These two contexts are class status and 
geographical habitation.  Given the prevalence of military activity that Vansina asserts, as 
well as its role in acquiring wealth supporting the central court, one can conclude that 
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these activities created the context whereby court representatives established the 
differences between elites and servants as well as the disparities in wealth that existed 
over geographical distance between the center and the periphery. The virtues set forth in 
the mythology set the standard for behavioral norms and expectations for both elites and 
non-elites and to some extent permitted transmission across the boundaries between 
them. 
The acquisition and redistribution of the wealth of the region were the primary 
methods in which the central court became established as the material and political elite. 
Because other natural resources were scarce, material wealth was manifested primarily in 
cattle. Through the exertion of military power, the king was able to acquire the cattle of 
other leaders in the region, then to redistribute them among powerful lords in return for 
loyalty, and to create official herds for himself, his ritualists, and his armies (Vansina 
Antecedents 67, 68). This had the effect of expanding the boundaries of the kingdom, 
whose institutions included the armies themselves. The division of armies into Tutsi and 
Hutu had the effect of spreading the functional sense of these terms throughout the 
country and creating the occupational stereotypes of Tutsi as herders and Hutu as farmers 
(Vansina Antecedents 135). Meanwhile, the concentration of cattle wealth at court 
allowed for the beginnings of a rich and complex culture at court, in which elites 
expressed their status through luxury commodities (Vansina Antecedents 81-85, 157). 
Army commanders became prominent at court while their distant armies represented 
central control; thus, these commanders replaced the local chiefs as the authority figures 
in these peripheral regions (Vansina Antecedents 78). Those who frequented court life 
imitated the king, who enjoyed the foremost status as the Rwandan ideal in terms of 
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attire, manners, language, and, as in the case of Mazimpaka, physical beauty (Vansina 
 
Antecedents 84). 
 
The usage of the term “Hutu” to denote foreigners also dates to the period of 
expansion by the central kingdom. Expansion occurred from the regions south of the 
Nyabarongo River to the east, north, and west.  Expansion to the south did occur, 
although the central court found that serious campaigns of expansion could go no further 
than the border of Burundi. Vansina states that to the north and west, all persons came to 
be “Hutu” in the court nomenclature, while to the east and south, the court customarily 
assumed that persons of both Hutu and Tutsi status resided (Antecedents 135). With the 
expansion of central power and the culture of prosperity exemplified at court, those who 
faced integration at the coming of central armies had one of two reactions. Some fled to 
regions that lay beyond the reach of the central kingdom; others embraced the court 
culture and sought to achieve some of the material success that it offered by accepting the 
standards and expectations that it set forth. Others accepted court power as a new reality 
rather than risk losing everything through resistance (Vansina Antecedents 71). 
As expansion and centralization progressed, the court usage of the term “Hutu” in 
the sense of foreigners extended to persons living especially in the regions of Gisaka to 
the east, Kinyaga to the west, and Ndorwa to the north. This brought the terminology of 
“Hutu” and “Tutsi” as designations of status into wider usage. It then also became 
possible for individuals within the system possessing the endowments of wealth, 
competency, or connection to negotiate court definitions to their advantage. The myths 
that Mamdani cited showed that the gradation between these identities was conceived by 
the court as a function of personal merit, such as self-discipline and the capacity for 
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leadership or warfare. 
 
In regard to Rwandan scholarship, I argue that this model of the precolonial 
kingdom provides an extremely relevant basis for changing the discussion surrounding 
Hutu and Tutsi as historic identities. These were designations of status relative to a 
historical, court-centered norm or ideal. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate that the 
central court of the precolonial kingdom did acknowledge disparities in wealth and in 
geographical space existing between the Tutsi central court and the Hutu peoples of 
border regions.  While this disparity received acknowledgment from the court in ritual 
and ideological symbolism, the economic and political realities of the expanding 
kingdom precluded the possibility of giving actual representation to Hutu leadership. For 
this reason, revolutionary movements emerged to contest expansion as well as to assert a 
claim to the very kingship that was symbolic of central authority. 
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Chapter 2: The Nyabarongo River: The King as Ritual Mediator 
 
 
In this chapter, I focus on the ideology of divine kingship as a conservative basis 
for social cohesion and economic prosperity. The ideology of divine kingship primarily 
served to legitimate the hierarchy and the centralization that was occurring in Rwanda in 
the two centuries prior to colonialism. At the same time, the ritual performance of 
kingship demonstrated the court's recognition of a reciprocity between the court and its 
subjects, across economic and geographical disparities. In one of his primary ritual 
functions, the king physically served as a mediator for this geographical disparity. 
Understanding what the identities of Tutsi and Hutu mean and how that meaning has 
changed over time is vital to understanding the origins of Rwandan politics. I argue with 
Jan Vansina that these terms originated in the context of pre-colonial centralization and 
then came to include the occupational connotations with which they would later be 
identified. However, at no time until the 1930s, by the direct action of the Belgian 
administration, did the terms Hutu and Tutsi have the connotation of fixed races of 
people with biological, essential attributes (Longman Christianity 65).  With the use of 
oral tradition, the Nyiginya court4 were able to masterfully invoke myth and construct 
 
ritual to legitimate the king's authority within, and beyond the borders of, the kingdom. 
Some degree of sensitivity to the kingdom's social conditions and problems helped 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 “Nyiginya” refers to the dynastic family that controlled the court for most of Rwanda's history. In this 
paper “Nyiginya court” and “Rwandan royal court” are interchangeable, until the colonial period. 
  
inform their actions. 
The terms Hutu and Tutsi came into being in reference to geographical location as 
well as class or status. Rwanda's emergence into nationhood began in earnest almost two 
centuries prior to colonialism, with the expansion of a strong central kingdom that 
developed a pronounced hierarchical structure by the end of the nineteenth century 
(Vansina Antecedents 67).  However, the borders of the emerging central kingdom did 
not include all of the surrounding territories and political bodies that would come to be a 
part of the nation during colonialism. People of these regions retained a degree of 
autonomy in spite of ongoing efforts by the central kingdom to incorporate them. The 
peoples of the surrounding regions first appear in a collective entity as the cultural 
“Other” in relationship to the central kingdom.5 It is in the context of this identification 
between the ruling class and the “Other” that the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” emerge. 
 
Thus centralization provides the basis for the usage of the terms “Tutsi” and 
“Hutu” prior to colonization; the terms developed in tandem with the growth of the 
kingdom and are of comparatively recent origin (Vansina Antecedents 234).  To look at 
the distinction as primordial is a major error that Westerners frequently make when trying 
to understand Rwandan history.  When the term “Tutsi” probably originated in reference 
to people who herded cattle, only later to assume its connotations of elite status at court, 
the term “Hutu” came into use as a pejorative.  The word could have a number of 
different meanings; most commonly it identified one who was a servant or social inferior. 
 
5 Catharine and David Newbury have taken major strides toward re-conceptualizing precolonial Rwanda 
as a loosely knit cluster of imperfectly incorporated kingdoms or political bodies around an expanding 
central kingdom. See The Cohesion of Oppression and The Land Beyond the Mists: Essays on Identity 
and Authority in Precolonial Congo and Rwanda for more discussion of precolonial realities. Together, 
the Newburys have demonstrated that a complete picture of the precolonial peoples demands taking 
each region on its own terms. 
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Alternately, it could refer to a rustic peasant removed from the society emerging around 
the kingdom, in a similar sense to the archaic English terms “boor” or “villain” (Vansina 
Antecedents 271). The pejorative would have applied to persons of subject status living 
within the kingdom as well as nobles and subjects in the surrounding regions. When the 
terms were first in use in distinction from one another, the difference became 
hierarchical. It is debatable that the division took on the nature of an ethnic division prior 
to colonialism, through Tutsi patterns of other-avoidance; however, it is not at all 
possible to claim that the division carried the baggage of scientific European race theory 
until colonialism (Vansina Antecedents 134).6 
“Tutsi” was self-applied by elites and rulers of the court, whose power derived 
from their economic control of cattle. Conversely, “Hutu” referred to outsiders, 
comprised of two general categories of people: the subjects in the central kingdom, and 
all people of the surrounding kingdoms, subjects and rulers alike, whom the central 
kingdom were interested in incorporating. To identify as a Tutsi, one needed to be of the 
ruling class, which normally meant serving as an official in or from the central kingdom, 
not one of the surrounding smaller kingdoms. Furthermore, it is unlikely that people in 
the kingdoms outside the central kingdom would have used the term “Hutu” at all in 
reference to themselves, perhaps through most of the colonial period (C. Newbury 
Cohesion 10, 11). 
The expanding central kingdom acquired a large amount of political power 
through its marshaling of resources.  One major institution that enabled it to do this was 
 
 
6 See also Mamdani 101: “[D]uring the founding period of the state of Rwanda...Tutsi was most likely an 
ethnic identity. Hutu...was never an ethnic identity; it was rather constructed as a transethnic identity of 
subjects.” 
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the system of clientship that is probably the best-known feature of the pre-colonial 
economy. The usage of the constructed identities of Hutu and Tutsi and the economic 
disparity between them hardened to some degree, though not completely, around the 
institution of uburetwa, a form of patronage in which a Tutsi noble requisitioned labor 
from Hutu who inhabited the noble's lands (Vansina Antecedents 134). This form of 
clientship emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. While Jan Vansina saw 
the development of uburetwa as splitting Rwandan society into polarized and fixed ethnic 
identities through growing class inequalities before colonialism (Vansina Antecedents 
134), Western sources during the earlier part of the colonial period indicate that these 
identities still depended on context, rather than on birth. They also suggest that the 
division was not fixed, but had strong connotations of status and occupation, with the 
Tutsi generally occupying the upper status and controlling the use of cattle. Hutu were 
lower class and generally practiced agriculture, although many herded cattle as well, if 
only through their obligations as clients of the Tutsi patrons. In 1922, Leon Classe, Vicar 
Apostolic of the Catholic White Fathers for most of the colonial period, wrote: 
It should be noted that the term 'Tuutsi' often refers not to origin (descent) but to social 
condition, or wealth, especially as regards cattle: whoever is a chief, or who is rich will often 
be referred to as Tuutsi. Frequently also, because of their manner or their language...the 
inhabitants of the provinces of Central Rwanda...are referred to as Tuutsi (C. Newbury 
Cohesion 12). 
As late as 1939, it was still possible for the historian Louis de Lacger to explain the 
terminology of Hutu and Tutsi as qualifiers or accepted discourse with reference to social 
status or class rather than as fixed racial identities. According to Lacger, a Hutu could 
become Tutsi through acquiring wealth and economic power, while a Tutsi could become 
Hutu through losing them (C. Newbury Cohesion 12). Considering the fact that Belgian 
administrators would turn Hutu and Tutsi into stratified ethnic identities as a matter of 
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policy on the basis of the racial argument, these statements may come as a surprise. This 
is especially true since they date to within less than ten years of the policy to implement 
ethnic identification cards. 
One common way that scholars have interpreted the difference between Tutsi and 
Hutu, especially in the mid-twentieth century, was to say that they were caste identities in 
a feudal society. This is what is known as the “functionalist” view of Rwanda's pre- 
colonial history. This feudal model depended heavily on the institution of clientship. For 
much of the twentieth century, the scholarly orthodoxy was that clientship institutions 
served to unite society vertically, across lines of socioeconomic inequality. The most 
representative work in portraying this view of pre-colonial Rwanda has been Jean- 
Jacques Maquet's The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda, first published in the 1950s. The 
interpretation of the two groups as castes is a major change from the European writers 
who described the groups in terms of class status in the 1920s and 1930s, seen above in 
the writings of Classe and Lacger. 
In The Cohesion of Oppression, Catharine Newbury challenged Maquet's model 
of Rwandan society. Newbury stated that Hutu and Tutsi cannot have been castes on the 
grounds that economic specialization was not as clear-cut as scholars since Maquet had 
thought. She also cited Classe and Lacger to show that the terms were situational, and 
one person could be both Hutu and Tutsi during the course of a single lifetime. 
Additionally, Newbury made the important observation that, in contrast to cultures that 
employ a caste system, Rwandans had no religious ideology to sanction the Tutsi-Hutu 
distinction (11). On the one hand, this argument from Newbury is debatable on the 
grounds of the myths I discuss in the previous chapter.  On the other hand, I would 
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contest the assertion purely on the grounds that Rwandans did not recognize the Western 
dichotomy between sacred and secular spheres; any institution or component of society 
that required explanation would receive what Westerners could see as a religious 
explanation (Mamdani 79, 80). However, Newbury is also partially correct, because to 
think of pre-colonial Rwandan religion as a uniform set of doctrines for all to accept is 
equally inaccurate. While the institution of divine kingship represented an assertion of a 
unilateral religious prerogative on the part of the monarch, local regional religious 
movements rose up to challenge this assertion.  One such resistance movement will be 
the subject of chapter 3. Ancestor-veneration was another means by which local power 
organized and asserted itself. 
I contend that political entities in Rwanda both before and during colonialism 
shared a religious culture, and that this culture provided the basis for social action 
through religious discourse. Bruce Lincoln's argument for the instrumentality of the past 
uses the example of ancestral invocations in societies organized around the clan. This is 
directly relevant to Rwandan society, which observed a system of ancestor-veneration 
prior to colonialism. Lincoln observes that, by selectively invoking ancestors either 
shared or not in the case of quarrels between lineages, societies may draw on sentiments 
to mobilize inter-lineage opposition or appeasement (20). 
Lincoln has provided examples in which myths (which he defines as a narrative 
possessing both credibility and authority, thus including ancestor-invocation, among 
other variations) legitimate both conservative as well as revolutionary programs (25, 45- 
50). Both conservative, hierarchical motivations, representing the royal court of the 
central kingdom, as well as dispersed revolutionary motivations (especially in the 
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prophetic movements of the northern region) appear in the information that currently is 
available on the precolonial and colonial religion of Rwanda. Culture is thus a 
comprehensible phenomenon that one can approach through sociopolitical referents. 
However, a major element that I will discuss with this thesis will be the failure to 
adequately interpret culture on the part of the Europeans during the colonial period. My 
goal is to explain, how, in this situation, sociopolitical referents were misinterpreted and, 
as a result of this misinterpretation, how a society with serious internal conflicts came 
into being. In doing so, I will show how, in keeping with Lincoln's ideas, elites make use 
of myth to shape and alter societies. 
I begin my analysis of the religious culture of Rwanda by describing the 
institution of the mwami or king. The office of the king was mythically associated with 
the hierarchy of the central kingdom; the most well-known economic referent of this 
hierarchy is the institution of clientship. The Kinyarwanda terms ubuhake and uburetwa 
designate two forms of clientship. Rwanda scholarship historically has focused on 
ubuhake. While Mamdani maintains that a degree of reciprocity between patrons and 
clients existed under this system (66), both he and Newbury assert that ubuhake was in 
reality a system that reflected growing exploitation of patrons over clients (Newbury 73, 
Mamdani 65); by comparison, uburetwa begins at a later period in history and is still 
more exploitative (Mamdani 66). I also claim that the king's role of unifying the central 
kingdom with its neighbors involved a ritual mediation of space that came into effect in a 
recasting of the ideology of divine kingship near the end of the eighteenth century. In the 
process, it will be necessary for me to discuss the ritual function of the Nyabarongo 
River, as well as the ritual opposition of regions north and south of this river. Some 
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discussion of certain political and cultural differences between regions of north and south 
will also become necessary. 
The case for discussing Rwanda's precolonial monarchy as an example of divine 
kingship comes directly out of Rwanda's oral tradition. Prior to his coronation, the king 
was a member of the Tutsi nobility, residing at a royal court in the center of the country. 
After taking the throne, the traditions accorded him a higher status. As Jan Vansina 
wrote: 
The essence of the royal quality is expressed in the saying that “the king, he is God” in which 
“God” translates as “imana.” This word refers to the essence of life or of fecundity. This 
essence manifests itself in all sorts of things, including objects used for a divination of which 
the result was favorable. Such objects are kept as material proof of imana nziza, “a favorable 
fate.” In the abstract “imana” now refers to a being who is the creator or God (Vansina 
Antecedents 83) 
 
This status of the precolonial monarch found in the oral tradition makes it necessary to 
contextualize the Rwandan monarch in the larger phenomenon of divine kingship found 
through much of precolonial Africa and similar to other institutions throughout the world. 
In The Golden Bough, James Frazer first remarked on this institution as being essentially 
founded in the equivalence between the monarch and the prosperity of the kingdom. 
Divine kingship, according to Frazer, was an office similar to that of a magician or priest, 
in that it linked prosperity to the correct practice of ritual formulae (100, 105, 106). 
Frazer's divine kings endured a severe loss of personal autonomy; the demands of the 
rituals were so taxing that the king oftentimes was constrained to performing the duties of 
office and nothing more. If the guaranteed prosperity did not appear, the king must 
undergo punishment or death. In Frazer's model, the fortuitous succession from one king 
to the next was only assured through the practice of regicide, as only regicide guaranteed 
that the soul of the king could be appropriately retained and transmitted by ritualists to a 
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vigorous successor (320, 321). 
 
The Rwandan king was in the position of being personally constrained by a litany 
of rituals like those Frazer described. Although Frazer's illustrative language tends to 
caricature divine kings as total weaklings, the Rwandan kings similarly had little political 
power to match their theoretically immense mystical and ritual importance (Vansina 
Antecedents 94)7.  While Vansina and Maquet, among others, agree that the Rwandan 
king was identified with prosperity, there is no record that the Rwandan king underwent 
the ritual of regicide as hypothesized by Frazer among, for example, the Shilluk of the 
Sudan. 
We can get a clear picture of the reason for the absence of a ritual of regicide by 
taking into account E.E. Evans-Pritchard's view of the Shilluk ritual. As discussed by 
Benjamin Ray, Evans-Pritchard viewed regicide as necessitated by the existence of 
factional competition. When the king became too closely associated with the interests of 
one faction over the other, thus threatening the universality of the office, regicide 
presented the pretext for eliminating the king and restoring balance by installing a new 
king. While Ray himself acknowledges a lack of evidence to support Evans-Pritchard's 
view, Ray endorses this argument in that it roots kingship in the domain of politics, rather 
than in mystical doctrine (Ray 121). This nuance is of value as we return again to 
Rwanda; while ritual regicide such as Frazer described was unknown, the occasional 
 
 
7 The scholarship on Rwandan kingship thus underwent a significance change in direction after Jacques 
Maquet asserted the absolutism of the king in The Premise of Inequality in Ruanda, 1961. In Civilizations 
of Black Africa (1972), however, Maquet does give the suggestion of the ritual constraints of divine 
kingship: “The king is identified with his kingdom so closely that if his strength declines his country 
becomes weak; that is why he cannot survive the onset of old age; he lives in ritual isolation which as far as 
possible prevents contacts with the profane, he cannot eat in public, often during audiences he is protected 
by a curtain from the public gaze....” (Maquet Civilizations 130). There is no suggestion by Vansina that 
Rwandan monarchs underwent the ritual of regicide. 
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coup d'etat or civil war did tend to emerge from the conflict between court interests. One 
such coup occurring late in the nineteenth century sparked several resistance movements 
among subjects of the central court who did not have any means of representation at 
court. This episode in Rwanda's history forms part of the discussion in chapter 3 of this 
essay. The coup subsequent resistance movements demonstrate the imbalance in 
representation in Rwanda at the time. 
In Myth, Ritual, and Kingship in Buganda, Ray offers further challenges to the 
idea that divine kingship pertained to all African societies. Although John Roscoe, a 
student of Frazer and early scholar on Buganda, attributed many elements of Frazer's 
theory to Bugandan kingship, Roscoe was incorrect in many instances. The Bugandan 
king was not an incarnate deity and did not become one after death; the king did not 
embody a cosmic life force and did not suffer ritual execution in old age. Although, as 
Ray says, the gods and royal ancestors were “metaphysically the same,” the royal 
ancestors were inferior to other gods representative of war or other elements of Bugandan 
society. If the term “god” had any application to the king, Ray states, it is as a matter of 
social status rather than as a means of identifying the king with a high god. The gods 
served the state of Buganda, according to Ray, and the king served the gods and their cult 
(41-49). Ray's critiques of Roscoe suggest several applications to Rwanda's situation as 
well.  In Rwanda too, the king did not have autonomous authority but was subject in 
many regards to the court's professional ritualists. Vansina's depiction of the king as 
divine depends upon the identity in terms used to name the high god—Imana—and to 
identify the essence of fecundity, imana, that the king ritually influenced.  In keeping 
with Vansina's interpretation, I have retained “divine” in reference to the king, yet both 
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Evans-Pritchard's and Ray's critiques should remove the connotation that Frazer and 
Roscoe projected onto African monarchs. 
In Kinyarwanda, Rwanda's primary language, the word for king is mwami. At the 
time Europeans came to the country, the term included the connotation of divinity, with a 
sense that the sovereign rightfully owned all lands and cattle within the kingdom (Maquet 
90, 91). Scholars today say that this absolute authority was invested theoretically and 
through myth and ritual, rather than as a matter of actual practice (Maquet 124, 125). In 
some cases the actual control of the king over elites may have been very weak (Vansina 
Antecedents 140). 
From Mukarutabana’s study of Rwada’s oral literature, it becomes evident that 
the king claimed the foremost mythic and ritual importance in the religious culture of the 
kingdom.  Mukarutabana states, 
The term Ubucurabwenge may be translated as the forging of intelligence, or mind. This 
document lists the genealogy of the Kings of Rwanda…. The genealogical list 
Ubucurabwenge is, as it were, the backbone of the whole Rwanda wisdom literature, around 
which the other three documents [myth, poetry,and rituals] are structured” (“Introduction” pg. 
4). 
According to myth and ritual, the king was identified both with the land itself and with 
Imana, the high god. Through performance of certain rituals, the power of the king 
assured the prosperity of the kingdom (Vansina Antecedents 38, 39). Accompanying the 
king at court were special ritualists (called abiiru in Kinyarwanda) who performed the 
vital function of providing continuous mythical and ritual legitimation for the king and 
the government according to the needs of the political moment (Vansina Antecedents 38, 
39; Des Forges Defeat 7). The presence of these ritualists enabled the king to make use 
of legitimizing narratives. The growth in the ritual and mythic importance of the king 
occurred as the central kingdom was becoming more powerful.  Jan Vansina first 
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submitted the possibility that a coup in the late eighteenth century not only greatly 
expanded the mythical importance of the king but also laid a number of new ritual 
restrictions on the performance of his office (Vansina Antecedents 90-95). This same 
period in Rwanda's history saw the seizure of major amounts of land and cattle from 
chiefs who had until that time been independent of the central court (Vansina Antecedents 
68-73). 
The rituals of divine kingship were essentially conservative in ideology and 
function. They mediated “outer” space on behalf of the central kingdom and regularized 
the passage of history within a cycle of regnal monarchic names. Developments in the 
ideology of divine kingship that Vansina dates to the latter part of the eighteenth century 
included the cycle of regnal names, along with a set of ritual obligations. The basis of the 
cycle of regnal names was that history is cyclical; the unity and prosperity of the kingdom 
were its objectives.  This ritual ideology attempted to bring about the desired prosperity 
by  assuring continuity  with  a  ritualization  of  a  past  that  had  already  seen the            
growth of material wealth and political influence (Vansina Antecedents 92). 
One can look at the ideology of divine kingship as a mythic parallel to the 
functionalist approach to the economic institution of clientship. By ritually linking the 
king to Imana, court tradition legitimated the king's authority by linking him to 
prosperity. Since the king was mystically identified with the land, it became necessary, 
according to the court's system, for all people to acknowledge the king's authority. Thus, 
through his office, the king's existence was good for the land and the people. This 
ideology parallels the argument by Maquet that the institution of clientship created an 
unproblematic social cohesion prior to colonialism by linking Hutu and Tutsi through a 
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“premise” that people in the country were functionally unequal. The invocation of Imana 
provided legitimation for the strong central kingship, since pre-colonial Rwanda had a 
monotheistic religious culture. The primary religious practice of common people was the 
veneration of ancestors, who also had power to bring prosperity or harm, depending on 
whether or not their descendants faithfully venerated them (Vansina Antecedents 30, 31; 
Maquet 87, 88).  To provide a larger geographical cohesion, the court invoked Imana; in 
a sense, he was the ancestor of all in his role as creator god. Although Imana usually did 
not interact with people directly, he was believed to be able to influence prosperity 
(Adekunle 29); hence the divine kingship first conveyed the sense of Rwanda as a unity 
of formerly dispersed clans and kingdoms with access to divine prosperity through 
obedience to the king. 
This is not to say that in practice the Rwandan kingdom achieved the full 
expectation of prosperity and unity through the ideology of divine kingship. Real 
fragmentation did exist within the kingdom, and this was in part because of the 
exploitation of the court alongside the ruling class's sense of its subjects' and neighbors' 
inferiority to them.  This is the hierarchical structure that the kingship ideology intended 
to preserve. However, the ritual and mythic nature of the king, identified as he was with 
prosperity through the invocation of Imana, provides a sense of the court's awareness of a 
mutual or shared interest or a reciprocity of prosperity between itself and the lower 
classes and weaker outlying kingdoms. The ritualists who constructed the ideology of the 
divine king clearly sensed that the nature of the ruler should be the embodiment of the 
welfare of the entire kingdom and its people, although in practice this ideology condoned 
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the hierarchy. 
 
The literature on Rwandan history and culture before colonialism offers other 
examples of the awareness of the obligation of king and court to its people, or its would- 
be people.  While these examples maintain the ritual and mythic pre-eminence of the 
king, they also find ways of diminishing the king in proximity to the subjects of the 
central kingdom, or the peoples of border kingdoms.  David Newbury elucidates one 
ritual that provides for the ceremonial reduction of the king for the sake of the unity and 
prosperity of society. In the umuganura, or First Fruits ceremony, the king plays the role 
of mediator between different groups across ritually opposed realms of geography. 
Newbury notes that the First Fruits ceremony emerged in the period following major 
expansions of the kingdom under the leadership of the king Rwabugiri (D. Newbury 
“Kingship” 233).8 Rwabugiri ruled Rwanda during most of the second half of the 
nineteenth century; he was the last king who ruled Rwanda for any substantial period of 
time without the interference of Europeans.  Rwabugiri campaigned continuously and as 
a result acquired many lands and brought many people under the rule of the central 
kingdom (D. Newbury “Campaigns” 130). The legitimacy of the central kingdom in its 
authority of recently (imperfectly) conquered peoples is a major concern of the ritual that 
Newbury describes.  The First Fruits ceremony profoundly reflects the rapid growth that 
the kingdom had recently undergone, in terms of both space and number of subjects; the 
 
 
 
8 Vansina argues that the umuganura began in the 17th century under king Ndori, whom he believes to 
have founded the Nyiginya kingdom; nevertheless, he concedes the ritual underwent major changes in 
the nineteenth century. The manifestation of the ritual Newbury describes must be from this later date, 
because the ritual diminution of the king reflects developments that followed the recasting of the 
ideology of kingship in the late eighteenth century. Furthermore, the institutional developments 
following Rwabugiri brought major changes to the major royal rituals, of which the First Fruits 
ceremony was among the foremost. Thus, it is necessary to interpret the ritual as portrayed by 
d'Hertefelt and Coupez in the light of these changes under Rwabugiri. 
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consequent widening of the obligations of the monarch comes through in the ceremony as 
equally profound. 
The First Fruits ceremony sought to promote the unity of the kingdom through the 
mediation of the opposing domains in the kingdom through the figure of the king. The 
first such pairing of opposite domains is in the dichotomic relationship between the lands 
north and south of the Nyabarongo River. 
The Nyabarongo River formed a natural division between the northern and 
southern regions of the kingdom, with the capital and heart of the Nyiginya kingdom 
lying to the south of the river. The central kingdom never completely incorporated the 
north. The distance and geographical features of the north, including the river and 
mountainous terrain, made this an extremely difficult proposition; although scholars often 
have spoken broadly of the people of the northern regions as “Hutu,” their own 
preference was to affiliate themselves with the region they inhabited: “people of Rukiga,” 
“...Ndorwa,” etc. (Vansina Antecedents 138, 139).9 It is this political cleavage that gave 
the Nyabarongo River its unique ritual function.  David Newbury's assessment of the 
river as dividing the kingdom into the essences of “Nature” and “Society” is compelling. 
I do not entirely agree with this conceptualization, however. While the geographical 
distinction in the ritual surely held deliberate implications for the peoples inhabiting 
either side, evidence does not suggest that Rwandans of the central kingdom viewed 
groups as essentially representative of the concept of “Nature” as opposed to “Society,” 
or vice versa (D. Newbury “Kingship” 235).  To me, the First Fruits ritual appears to 
 
 
9 In Defeat is the Only Bad News (ca. 1972), Alison Des Forges confirms the preferred regional 
nomenclature in a footnote, yet uses the court-inspired distinction of “Hutu” and “Tutsi” through most 
of her work. This is a testament to how influential court sources would become on the Western 
scholarly writing. 
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address the geographic and class distinctions that were potentially problematic to this 
kingdom. 
The ritual mediation of space through the king's physical location was an 
important concept in the Rwandan ideology of kingship. As in the First Fruits ceremony, 
the Nyabarongo River provided the most important geographical barrier, as well as ritual 
demarcation of the kingdom into opposing northern and southern realms. The river 
marked an important political division as well; although the lands immediately north of 
the river belonged to the court, further north the regions of Ndorwa and Rukiga gave the 
kings who tried to incorporate them much trouble. Because of this political cleavage, the 
issue would have arisen as to where the king ought to locate his court. South of the river 
was the heart of the kingdom, with most of the king's subjects; clientship was a regular 
part of life and he ruled more comfortably. North of the river, there were fewer who 
willingly acknowledged the authority of the king, and a person's lineage held more 
importance than a person's patron. Without direct intervention from the king, the people 
living in these regions were more likely to resist attempts at controlling them or even 
mount an outright rebellion.  One king, Ndabarasa, spent the majority of his reign with 
his armies in the region of Ndorwa; possibly the extended silence from these regions until 
the end of Rwabugiri's reign late in the nineteenth century began at this time. However, 
Ndabarasa did this at the expense of maintaining direct presence at his own court 
(Vansina Antecedents 79). 
The Nyabarongo River came to take on its important ritual function following the 
recasting of the ideology of kingship. Under the new ideology of divine kingship, a 
proscription on crossing the river existed for certain kings, depending on their regnal 
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name. I argue that these proscriptions represent a ritual mediation of political opposition, 
or potential opposition, based upon geographical differences between the peoples of north 
and south.  According to the new ideology, there were five names in all and four in a 
given cycle: Cyirima, Mutara, Kigeri, Mibambwe, and Yuhi. The last three names were 
fixed in the second through the fourth spots in the rotation. In the first spot, the names 
Cyirima and Mutara alternated from odd- to even-numbered cycles (Vansina Antecedents 
92).  The first king in each cycle would live south of the river until the performance of  
the Path of the Watering ritual, at which point, the king would cross the river and live in 
the north until he died. Following the reign of the first king, Kigeri and Mibambwe ruled 
without restraint on where they could permissibly travel or dwell. This included regions 
like Ndorwa or Rukiga, as exemplified by Ndabarasa, who had the regnal name Kigeri. 
The later king Rwabugiri, well-known for military activity, also had the regnal name 
Kigeri. Vansina states that the middle kings of the cycle held the ritual expectation of 
being “warrior” kings and travel frequently and freely (Vansina Antecedents 92); hence, 
the first and final kings of the cycle are seen to balance expansion of the kingdom with 
preservation of the courtly obligations of the mwami and the oversight of more peaceful 
times. The fourth name in the cycle, Yuhi, represented the closing of the cycle. To 
perform this closing, Yuhi lived his entire life south of the Nyabarongo river, in the heart 
of the kingdom.  Following his death, his heir, either a Cyirima or a Mutara, would travel 
north at the Path of the Watering to begin the cycle again. Through the cycle, the 
presence of the king, which was of the utmost importance to the ideology of prosperity 
devised at court, could attend to the various regions of their domain proportionately. 
Clearly, the ritualization of the king's movement, especially vital in proximity to 
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the Nyabarongo river, has implications for the identities of “Hutu” and “Tutsi,” as 
defined by the court relative to centralization. As stated before, “Hutu” came into use as 
a pejorative in relationship to the self-described “Tutsi,” who originally applied both 
identifiers to the people of the region. In this context, “Hutu” could mean either 
“subject” or “rustic lout.” Yet the ideology of the kingship created the possibility, in 
theory, of Hutu becoming Tutsi. This became possible through the mitigation of the 
space that separated them—through the extension of court control by the traveling, or 
“warrior,” kings—and through the general access to Imana's prosperity through the 
embodiment of divinity found in the king himself, enacted through his ritual functions. 
As seen in the observations of Lacger, Hutu did become Tutsi through acquiring wealth, 
as late into the colonial period as the 1930s. 
The First Fruits ceremony provides another example of a ritual awareness on the 
part of the court of their own dependency on the Hutu for their well-being, and vice 
versa. In this ritual, the reciprocity between the Tutsi court and the Hutu is exhibited in 
the diminution of the king. In the First Fruits ceremony, the ritual proscription of passing 
across the Nyabarongo maintains; the king's ritual surrogates cross the river for him and 
transport hoes that have the king's blessing.  The town that receives these hoes greets 
them with the applause and sound of drums, which is the proper greeting for the king 
himself (D. Newbury “Kingship” 240, 241). Symbolically, the implements of agriculture 
and the ritual surrogates of the king transport the kingly imana (this Kinyarwandan term 
can also carry the animist sense of the words mana or chi) to the faraway residents, of 
whom the residents of the comparatively nearby Bumbogo region symbolize the larger 
country.  The power and authority of the king depart from him, in a sense, during this 
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ritual, to serve the subjects of the kingdom. The people who receive the hoes use them to 
sow sorghum, which they then harvest and send south to complete the ritual. 
In the later stage of the ceremony, the king's identification with divinity and 
prosperity is maintained; a meal made from the sorghum is placed in the king's bedroom 
along with other ritual implements associated with fertility.  The king and one of his 
wives engage in intercourse, as a further symbolic act of fertility, at this phase of the 
ritual, which takes place in his bedroom at night. Before dawn, an anonymous Hutu takes 
the sorghum from the house and eats it. Newbury correctly maintains that the ritual 
introduces the idea of the king as benefactor to the Hutu (D. Newbury “Kingship” 242, 
243).  In a later phase of the ceremony, the king is seated on a sheepskin, a ritual 
inversion of his kingly proprieties, as the king is forbidden to wear clothing made of 
sheepskin, while court custom maintains a taboo against eating lamb or mutton as food 
(D. Newbury “Kingship” 244). In this, once again, the reduction of the king from his 
theoretically divine status suggests a move toward the people of the country who are his 
subjects. 
In this chapter, I have shown how the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” originated and 
functioned in the context of centralization prior to the colonial period. While the term 
“Tutsi” originally applied probably to those who lived from herding cattle, in the context 
of the increasingly powerful central court, it took on the connotation of the court elites; 
juxtaposed to this elite status were the people of subject or foreign status, whom they 
referred to in the pejorative as Hutu. While, in the central kingdom, the usage of terms 
would take on the connotation of occupation, the status distinction was never entirely 
lost.  As a distinguisher of status, the terms also reflected a person's degree of wealth, so 
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that the terms were not fixed from birth and one could potentially move from one to the 
other. Meanwhile, the people of the outer kingdoms whom the court referred to as Hutu 
never entirely warmed to the designation, continuing to think of themselves merely as 
inhabitants of the region to which they belonged, Bakiga, Bandorwa, etc. Rather than 
exerting violent force to maintain control, rulers of the court and their ritualists 
constructed the ideology of divine kingship as a basis for a) the prosperity of the entire 
country, including their subjects in clientship relations, and b) the mediation of space 
between the central kingdom and the surrounding kingdoms, whom the court wished to 
incorporate and who could potentially take part in the form of prosperity that the divine 
power of Imana offered through the king. I have argued that this function of kingship is 
essentially conservative and can be seen to exist as a mythical corollary of the economic 
inequalities inherent in clientship relationships. 
The connection of the rituals of divine kingship did express a desire on the part of 
the court to provide for the eventual prosperity of what was effectively the lower class. 
Yet the ritual and symbolic involvement of non-real “Hutu” actors reflected 
unwillingness on the part of the court to make real provision for them or to divert from 
the more extreme forms of clientship imposed at the end of the nineteenth century. The 
court's rituals showed in concrete terms how Roland Barthes described myth as “a form 
of metalanguage in which preexisting signs are appropriated and stripped of their original 
context, history, and signification only to be infused with new and mystificatory 
conceptual content of particular use to the bourgeoisie” (Lincoln 5). 
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Chapter 3: The Ones Who Grab: Re-asserting Local Authority 
 
 
In this chapter, I argue that a revolutionary spirit-possession movement that 
occurred in northern Rwanda in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries grew 
from a crisis of representation, in which local northerners sought to assert national 
sovereignty through the center-controlled institution of divine kingship.  The basis for 
this argument comes from the evidence that northerners viewed themselves increasingly 
as members of a shared political culture with the more powerful political institutions of 
the south.  The people of different regions wanted to challenge the central court's 
authority over them. This chapter of the thesis focuses on the Nyabingi spirit-possession 
cults that arose in the northern regions of Ndorwa and Rukiga.  To contest the 
sovereignty of the king, this movement appealed to the cultural practice of ancestor- 
veneration, invoking the royal genealogies of Ndorwa's own bygone kingdom. This 
spirit-possession movement did not challenge the divinity of the Rwandan monarch in 
theory; instead, it made use of the premises of divine kingship to challenge the legitimacy 
of the sitting king. To accomplish this challenge to central legitimacy, the spirit- 
possession movement in question protested for its authority as a coherent ritual and 
political institution. The chapter focuses on spirit-possession or imandwa cults, in 
particular the Nyabingi cult as a political and cultural movement. This continues the 
efforts to discuss facets of precolonial Rwandan religion as parts of larger sociopolitical 
processes.  While this movement often serves as an example of conflict, it also clearly 
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represents an instance of political and cultural discourse. 
 
In his essay on the cult of Nyabingi, Jim Freedman describes the basic ritual of 
Nyabingi spirit invocation as follows: The person who required the aid of Nyabingi—the 
name of the widely recognized “ancestor” spirit—would go to a medium (mugirwa) who 
enacted the ritual of being possessed by Nyabingi, at which point in time the inquirer 
could ask for advice or healing. The response of the medium included a number of 
cliches—although not in any fixed order or liturgy—giving reference to names of 
geographical locations or historical persons, genealogies, or events. The names of 
persons contained in the cliches were members of Nyabingi's family (Freedman 172). 
The illusion that the medium created with this performance, then, was that the spirit of 
Nyabingi, making contact with the inquirer through the body of the medium, requested 
supernatural assistance through the company of spirits whom she knew in life and with 
whom she continued to associate in the afterlife.  Cliches that the mediums frequently 
used include the following: “Should I be lying, send me to the Bagina who have killed 
Murari!” was the oath that regularly concluded Nyabingi-possession rituals; the Nyabingi 
spirit invoked other spirits through what certainly appear to be genealogical sequences: 
“Gahaya ka Murari wa Nyakajunga”; other names invoked included, “Nyabunyana, the 
mother of Nyabingi”; “Quickly Rutindangyezi, lighting of Gahaya, son of Murari, 
grandson of Rubunda....”; “Nyabingi of my father, be with you, you have come by way of 
Mahura, you have come by Mpororo, you have passed by Ndorwa and have crossed the 
Nduga, Rutindangeri, son of Gahaya, be with you...” (Freedman 171, 172).  By drawing 
on these genealogical names and geographical locations, the medium invoked the royal 
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and ancestral power of the old kingdom if Ndorwa. 
 
Historical factors that precipitated the emergence of the Nyabingi cult show that 
this movement was a move for national representation of local interests, rather than a 
rebellion against kingship itself or a push for local independence. The fact that this was 
able to occur shows that inhabitants in the north who joined the cult had to share in a high 
degree the culture of the central court.  This strongly suggests that the north and the 
center did belong to a single culture, with a boundary such as Barth described dividing 
the two, rather than totally separate cultures (6). The Nyabingi cult's coalescence under 
the leadership of Muhumusa was able to occur because of succession crises that had 
violated hereditary processes and installed a king who did not have a legitimate claim. 
Muhumusa herself came from the central kingdom; she had been a wife, as she claimed, 
of the Rwandan king Rwabugiri, who had died in 1895. She had been forced to flee from 
court in the aftermath of the coup against Rwabugiri's chosen successor. This coup had 
resulted in the death of Rwabugiri's appointed successor, Rutarindwa, and in the 
accession of Musinga, then still a child. Muhumusa had brought with her a son who was 
eligible to succeed Rwabugiri in place of Musinga; she built her movement as a challenge 
to Musinga's legitimacy (Des Forges Defeat 103). Muhumusa's ability to arouse local 
support for her movement came from the prophetic expectations that a woman named 
Nyabingi would return to the region to lift the oppression of the central kingdom from the 
local people. She had been a member of or aide to the Ndorwan royal family and 
possessed special powers. In addition to identifying as a wife of Rwabugiri, Muhumusa 
claimed to be Nyabingi herself, thus fulfilling the regional desire for a historical 
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charismatic leader. 
The socioeconomic context of the Nyabingi and other revolutionary cults of the 
period was that of growing inequality and the spread and solidification of Tutsi 
hegemony and control. Freedman argued that the Nyabingi ritual was a means of 
establishing a political order independently of one that currently existed and without 
reference to one that had previously existed. He did not see this system as primarily 
existing to preserve or to protest against another political institution. The position I take 
contradicts Freedman's arguments on both points. I argue that the Nyabingi spirit- 
possession cult of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries derived its religious 
authority from the culture of the wider region.10 This regional culture transcended the 
kingdom of Rwanda, including much of the African Great Lakes area. Elizabeth Hopkins 
has noted that when the Nyabingi cults first emerged in the late nineteenth century, they 
 
already had the characteristic of offering protection to Hutu against central expansion 
(262). Like other revolutionary movements in peripheral regions, these groups identified 
themselves in opposition to the central court when they saw their own labors reinforcing 
court prosperity while doing little to increase their own material wellbeing or political 
power. This happened concurrently with the introduction of harsher clientship practices 
that increased the demands the court placed on northerners (Vansina Antecedents 135, 
136). While the cult remains of interest to scholarship primarily as a revolutionary 
movement in the context of Rwanda's late monarchical and colonial periods, its 
effectiveness in this role was inseparable from its ability to mobilize beliefs and spiritual 
 
 
10 Freedman also challenged the status of the Nyabingi cult as an example of the imandwa complex, yet his 
argument in part rests on the fact that Freedman did not see this cult as protesting the central court, which 
he said that the imandwa did and which I argue that Nyabingi did. See Freedman, p. 171 
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entities recognizable to a large region. The movement emerged as one of many imandwa, 
or spirit-possession cults that grew out of the regional practice of ancestor-veneration. 
Ancestor-veneration in Rwanda predated the emergence of a powerful central 
kingdom. Each person was born into a lineage associated with a specific hill, often along 
with several other lineages. Once a lineage became too large, there would be conflict, at 
which point a new lineage would break away from the old one, move to a new hill, and 
begin its new ancestral genealogy with the oldest male (Vansina Antecedents 31). A 
sense of this kind of identity and its political utility in oral cultures appears in Bruce 
Lincoln's discussion of ancestor-invocation: 
[W]hen a man of lineage 1 struggles with a man of lineage 2, they invoke Ancestors 1 and 2 
respectively, that is, the apical ancestors from whom they and all members of their lineages 
claim descent—but not more remote antecedents nor others more proximate. When the time 
arrives to make peace, however, they invoke Ancestor A together: the figure through whose 
recollection may be formed that social group in which they are reunited (20). 
 
Since conflict resulted in the migration of the now divided lineage, lineage and 
geography (or hill) were thus very closely associated. One's lineage and genealogy were 
also of vital importance in precolonial Rwanda, since one was responsible for obtaining 
revenge in the event that a member of the same lineage was killed or robbed (Vansina 
Antecedents 30, 31). In this way veneration of the ancestors belonging to one's lineage 
created very important ties of loyalty that often preceded the loyalty to king or patron. 
As centralization advanced into the late eighteenth century, a significant change in 
the ideology of divine kingship occurred, that greatly affected the regional practice of 
ancestor-veneration. This recasting of kingship ideology brought about the cycles of 
regnal names, described in the previous chapter; it also brought about changes in the 
ritual performance of kingship that many scholars since Vansina have observed as 
restricting the real freedom and individuality of the king for the purposes of increasing 
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his symbolic status (Vansina Antecedents 94).  Along with this theoretical elevation of 
the king, the central court tried to make other changes to the society of the kingdom and 
the subjects it ruled or aspired to rule. These changes included abolishing ancestor- 
veneration throughout the kingdom (Vansina Antecedents 93). The desire to eliminate 
other ties of loyalty may have been the basis for this move; another reason might have 
been the court's desire to end the practice of interlineage vendettas. Whatever the reason 
for the removal of ancestor-veneration practices, the area of Rwandan culture that it most 
immediately affected was its history, through the elimination of local genealogies. 
Although the retention of the genealogy of a lineage by the head of a family as 
part of that family's private oral tradition was not synonymous with ancestor-veneration, I 
argue that no clear distinction between the two practices existed. Instead, the one was 
dependent on the other.  I argue that genealogies and ancestor-veneration were 
interrelated as the backbone of precolonial Rwandan politics, especially at the local level, 
and especially outside the central kingdom.  Thus, the court's decision to ban ancestor- 
veneration—even though this ban did not last for more than forty years11—was an 
 
attempt to suppress local politics. The record indicates that in spite of all efforts by the 
court, the practice of vendettas, mandated by the ancestor cult, was continuous, so this 
measure by the central court probably was of limited effectiveness (Vansina Antecedents 
95). 
Bruce Lincoln's theory of ancestor invocation corresponds with a feature of 
Rwanda's oral genealogies: they make claims about a group's origins and explain current 
 
 
 
11 This is an outside estimate based again on Vansina's chronology; see Vansina, Antecedents, pp. 93, 213 
and 216 
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relations between social groups. This means that genealogies in oral tradition may 
undergo alterations when those social relations change (Vansina Oral Tradition 182).  
The invocation that Lincoln mentions above was a vital component in the oral culture of 
precolonial Rwanda. Conflicts between lineages, usually resulting from the 
overpopulation of a shared hill, led to the breaking up and forming of new lineages 
(Vansina Antecedents 31). Such a separation also made it necessary for the two new 
lineages to relocate. From the point of this breaking, the family head would no longer 
recite the genealogy that was formerly shared as part of the now-broken original lineage; 
as founder of the new lineage, he became the first in the new genealogy (Vansina 
Antecedents 31). Because lineages occupied a single hill, and the breaking of a lineage 
meant a move away from the hill and an end to the recitation of the genealogy that had 
once united that lineage, I argue that genealogies were directly tied to geographical 
location. These genealogies manifested themselves in recitation, but they also manifested 
themselves in the rites of ancestor-veneration that the head of the family performed, at 
shrines located at the residence of the lineage. 
As a historian of oral traditions, Jan Vansina has observed that an “amnesia,” or 
loss of genealogical and historical information, occurred following the abolition of 
ancestor-veneration in the recasting of the ideology of kingship (Vansina Antecedents 
95). Information concerning bad relations between lineages was encoded in these 
traditions, as the genealogies indicated circumstances, of varying degrees of historical 
accuracy, surrounding the original hostilities.  The move to ban ancestor-veneration 
would have impoverished political information for all lineages in Rwanda and the 
bordering kingdoms; with another measure that was to some degree related to the ban, the 
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names of earlier kings of the central kingdom whom the historical annals remembered 
unfavorably did not become part of the four-part cycles of regnal names. Names from the 
oral tradition that the central court preserved in the cycles were those whom tradition 
remembered as bringing victory and prosperity.  These became the basis for the 
archetypes to which each king was expected to conform, as a “warrior” king, a “cattle” 
king, etc. (Vansina Antecedents 92). The characteristics associated with each archetype 
grew more complex over time, with the occurrence or the invention of new historical 
precedents (Vansina Antecedents 94, 95). 
The abolition of ancestor-veneration demonstrates the conflict that existed 
between divine kingship and local ancestor-worship in the precolonial kingdom. This 
conflict is important in understanding how regional imandwa movements came to protest 
central kingship in favor of local sovereignty. The ban on ancestor-worship took place 
during the reign of Ndabarasa, a Kigeri “warrior” king, who, as noted in the previous 
chapter, spent the majority of his reign north of the Nyabarongo River, in the region of 
Ndorwa. Ndabarasa's military activity and his ongoing presence in this region brought an 
end to the kingdom in this region, and I would also conclude that the elimination of 
ancestor-veneration and their shrines was a calculated move to rid prestigious or royal 
Ndorwan lineages of their key political associations. In addition to policies restricting the 
veneration of ancestors, the campaigns in Ndorwa eliminated the local sovereignty, an 
occurrence that in turn brought about the loss of the genealogies for the royal lineage of 
Ndorwa. Jim Freedman noted the loss of this information in his article on the language of 
Nyabingi-invocation; according to Freedman, the best historical information available 
indicates that the Nyabingi invocations preserve the names of some of these Ndorwan 
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kings (Freedman 173). I argue that the preservation of these names gave the Nyabingi 
movement a unique potency in uniting the people of the region in protest against central 
sovereignty; it achieved this potency through giving legitimacy back to local royal 
history. 
The use of dynastic names in Nyabingi-invocations reflected an attitude toward 
kingship that was common in Africa, according to Vansina: 
In many African or Polynesian kingdoms it was held that the only true general history was 
dynastic history. Kingship was the expression of the whole country and the past of the royal 
house was that of the nation....Any connection with royalty reflects on the status of descent or 
local groups, especially if the anecdote recalls a service rendered to the dynasty, or even more 
when descent from a king is claimed (Vansina Oral Tradition 107). 
 
The Nyabingi movement contested central kingship in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries by asserting itself and its leading spirit medium, a woman named 
Muhumusa, as the true representative of two dynasties: the Ndorwan royal lineage— 
eliminated through military conquest during the eighteenth-century reign of Ndabarasa— 
and the central monarchy itself, occupied at the time by Musinga. The invocation of 
Nyabingi made explicit reference to the kings of the earlier dynasty, thereby reasserting 
local royal history that the conquest had removed. 
The destruction of the earlier local monarchy by the central court, and the 
usurpation of the central kingship by a rival clan toward the end of the nineteenth 
century, is another factor precipitating the rise of the Nyabingi cult and its practices. The 
history of the region and its incorporation into Rwanda left northerners with the sense of 
belonging to a political body that preceded that of the central kingdom. Hopkins has 
argued that the use of Ndorwan royal tradition unquestionably validated the political 
aspirations of the cult as well as its imposition of a new centralization to rival that of the 
central court (264).  This identification with an earlier independent monarchy was 
76 
 
 
foregrounded for local groups in response to the socioeconomic depredations mentioned 
in chapter one. Freedman describes how the Nyabingi movement made use of dynastic 
and historical names related to the vanquished Ndorwan kingdom to make a claim for 
local sovereignty. The invocations that the medium of Nyabingi used included these 
names and expressions: “Nyabunyana, the mother of Nyabingi;” “quickly Rutindangyezi, 
lighting of Gahaya, son of Murari, grandson of Rubunda;” “Nyabingi of my father, be 
with you, you have come by way of Mahura, you have come by Mpororo, you have 
passed by Ndorwa and have crossed the Nduga, Rutindangeri, son of Gahaya, be with 
you.” Sometimes the invocation took the form of a genealogy of persons in the royal 
family, such as Murari, Gahaya, or Nyakajunga. The session closed with a claim of the 
speech's authenticity and the exclamation, “Should I be lying, send me to the Bagina who 
have killed Murari” (Freedman 171, 172). This phrase made reference to people whom 
Gahindiro employed to kill the heir to the line of Ndorwan kings after the destruction of 
the kingdom under Ndabarasa (Freedman 178). This demonstrates that the invocations of 
Nyabingi tied the spirit-possession movement to a lineage of kings in Ndorwa from at 
least one hundred years earlier. 
Taken together, the imandwa spirits generally emerged to supplement ancestor- 
veneration, creating unity across wider regional bases than those of immediate lineage 
and hill (Linden and Linden 14). The Kinyarwandan term for these spirits means, “the 
ones who grab;” the spirits who were the object of this particular form of veneration 
supposedly took possession of their initiates. Entry into an imandwa society was a public 
event (a kubandwa ceremony) at which a person received their initiation into the private 
society (Freedman 171).  Traditionally, the most widely revered imandwa in Rwanda was 
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Ryangombe, venerated mostly in southern and western parts of the kingdom (Adekunle 
30). The mythology surrounding Ryangombe seems to indicate some form of opposition 
to kingship, at least symbolically. According to the mythology, a bull killed Ryangombe. 
Because the bull sometimes symbolizes the king, this story makes Ryangombe the 
defeated opponent of the king (Adekunle 30; Vansina Antecedents 38, 41; Linden and 
Linden 14). 
The veneration of Ryangombe may have begun as a way of resisting royal power, 
or Ryangombe may have had a historical origin as a monarch who predated the first 
Nyiginya. But, by the early eighteenth century at the latest12, Ryangombe spirit- 
possession was a regular part of the ritual of the central court. Vansina notes that, while 
in the early days, the initiation to the spirit-possession movement of Ryangombe brought 
an egalitarianism along with it, by the nineteenth century, its long history of usage by the 
highly stratified central court had negated its old egalitarian effect (Vansina Antecedents 
39)13. Regardless of this move away from egalitarianism, a certain taboo prevented the 
king from making the ritual submission to the spirit of Ryangombe along with his 
subjects. According to this taboo, the king's elevated status made it unthinkable that he 
would make such a submission, even to a nearly deified heroic ancestor spirit. Perhaps 
 
 
12 For the date of the incorporation of Ryangombe into the Nyiginya court ritual, see the royal genealogy 
Vansina put forward using Rwandan oral history in Antecedents to Modern Rwanda. He dates the 
inclusion of Ryangombe spirit-possession in court ritual to the reign of Semugeshi, who followed Ndori 
and preceded Gisanura. Although Vansina gives only approximate dates for these two kings, he puts 
Ndori at ca. 1650, with Gisanura coming to power sometime “After 1700,” but before the accession of 
Mazimpaka, ca. 1735 (p. 216); see also Vansina, Antecedents, p. 58 
13 In the early days of the Ryangombe movement, the cult had been widespread in certain regions, not 
limited to the court, and had involved the suspension of social distinctions in the initiation and 
possession ceremonies. Moreover, membership in these cults was voluntary (Vansina Antecedents 39). 
Berger notes that even after incorporation into the central court, Ryangombe initiation was primarily for 
Hutu; it thus maintained an egalitarian dimension, as it added to the prestige of the Hutu and gave them 
potential access to court-level patrons (84). 
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because of certain after-life beliefs associated with Ryangombe, it still seemed beneficial 
for the king to formally submit to the imandwa, so a ritual surrogate underwent the 
initiation ceremony on behalf of the king (Vansina Antecedents 91; Linden and Linden 
15). The use of a ritual surrogate further demonstrates the very strong conservative 
ideology surrounding kingship that existed in Rwanda through much of the precolonial 
kingdom. The king's theoretically divine autonomy would remain an institution of the 
Rwandan court until the end of the colonial period. 
The shift in the ideology of Ryangombe spirit-possession, seemingly from anti- 
monarchical to a ritual institution of the central court, leads me to conclude that 
Ryangombe's incorporation by the court resembles in some manner the method by which 
rulers co-opt certain movements, as Antonio Gramsci outlines in Selections from the 
Prison Notebooks. According to Gramsci, class conflicts play out in civil society, as 
social groups resist control by a state or government through the construction of their 
own institutions. In response, governments or ruling classes try to extend their power 
over these institutions. Timothy Longman defines civil society as an “emergent area of 
autonomous social action...in which people are able to envision alternatives to the 
existing order” and which “creates possibilities for those who lack access to state power 
to empower themselves through other means” (Longman Christianity 21-24). These 
earlier spirit-possession practices united geographically and economically dispersed 
lineages and provided a means of challenging kingship as the ultimate authority and 
means to prosperity. Also, the potency of spirit-possession movements to challenge 
authority declined by becoming closely associated with and serving to legitimate the 
existing state.  The trouble that Ryangombe initiation originally caused for kingship 
79 
 
 
speaks to the political utility of ancestor-veneration and imandwa initiation. 
 
The example of Ryangombe is not unique; while tension existed between 
monarchs and mediums throughout East Africa, the historical tendency was for these 
institutions to move toward integration. In states weaker than the Rwandan court, 
mediums often had more influence or could insist that even the monarch undergo 
initiation (Berger 86). This tendency toward integration was so pronounced by the late 
nineteenth century that Berger classifies the militant resistance of the Nyabingi 
movement as a re-emergence of a phenomenon properly belonging to an earlier historical 
period (86). Surely such a development speaks to the unique degree of power exercised 
by the Rwandan state on the eve of colonialism. 
As a new manifestation on the culture of ancestor-veneration that predominated in 
northern regions of Rwanda, the spirit-possession cults reflected an important point of 
resistance in the spread of court influence. The litany of dynastic names found in the 
Nyabingi invocations serves the purpose of a genealogical recitation, in that it keeps alive 
the memory of and allegiance to the earlier monarchy.  It also ties them to the region in 
the memory of the cult, by invoking the names of geographical locations with which 
northern Hutu would be familiar. 
The Nyabingi movement provides an example of imandwa spirit-possession cults; 
these cults originated in beliefs in ancestor veneration. As the most widespread religious 
practice in the kingdoms of the Great Lakes region, ancestor veneration had the potential 
to unite (as well as to divide) diverse lineages over wide territories. Iris Berger states that 
spirit mediumship and possession represents the oldest religious culture in the region, 
probably preceding the movement of pastoralists into East Africa (67, 89).  As such, 
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spirit mediumship and possession has been integrally connected to power and resistance 
throughout East African history. An imandwa cult emerged for an ancestor or dynastic 
spirit whose veneration came to pervade a geographical area above and beyond that of a 
single lineage. While scholars have historically suggested evolutionary models for the 
development of these movements that bear some similarity to the views of E.B. Tylor, I 
argue that the culture of ancestor veneration created a possibility for counter-hegemonic 
identity to emerge through incorporation of certain ancestor spirits by many lineages13. 
 
Through the connection between ancestor veneration and prosperity, the cult that I 
examine was able to create a nucleus for rituals of prosperity that sought to rival that of 
the central court. It is essential to make sense of this new hub in the context of expansion 
and centralization of the Nyiginya court. The movement ultimately acquired its stature 
and political directionality as an oppositional force to the Nyiginya. 
The Nyabingi cult was an intrinsically local movement that reproduced a local 
royal lineage through genealogical cliches to supersede loyalty to the divine king. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Rwandan central court overtly opposed the 
veneration of ancestors in peripheral regions. By extension, one can conclude that the 
view of the court toward spirit-possession cults was that they were a threat. As stated 
above, the effect of Nyabingi on the region of Rukiga and Ndorwa was to reinforce 
lineage-based relationships and authority (Berger 73). The Nyabingi movement utilized 
lineage-based authority to actively contest the spread of the court's political power. To 
do this, Nyabingi-invocation made use of local genealogies.  These genealogies were 
13 This naturalistic evolutionary approach to religious development may account for Freedman's assertion 
that Nyabingi was trying to produce a regional governmental body ex nihilo. Tylor's model also seems 
to have informed the interpretation by Ian and Jane Linden, who see the emergence of Ryangombe's 
cult with the rise of military culture under Ndori; see Linden and Linden, p. 14 
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contained in the cliches of a Nyabingi medium, as shown in the litanies mentioned earlier 
by Freedman. These cliches made reference to a local dynasty that the central kingdom 
had wiped out over a century earlier.  The use of the cliches in this way thus had the 
effect of reversing the attempted removal of local ancestor-veneration and the sense of 
political identity that went with this kind of veneration. Moreover, since the names 
contained in the Nyabingi cliches were names of royalty, the effect of the litanies was to 
recreate a sense of royal identity and authority at a local level. 
The use of dynastic names in Nyabingi-invocations reflected an attitude toward 
kingship that was common in Africa, according to Vansina: 
In many African or Polynesian kingdoms it was held that the only true general history was 
dynastic history. Kingship was the expression of the whole country and the past of the royal 
house was that of the nation....Any connection with royalty reflects on the status of descent or 
local groups, especially if the anecdote recalls a service rendered to the dynasty, or even more 
when descent from a king is claimed (Vansina Oral Tradition 107). 
 
The Nyabingi movement contested central kingship in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries by asserting itself and its leading spirit medium, a woman named 
Muhumusa, as the true representative of two dynasties: the Ndorwan royal lineage— 
eliminated through military conquest during the eighteenth-century reign of Ndabarasa— 
and the central monarchy itself, occupied at the time by Musinga. The invocation of 
Nyabingi made explicit reference to the kings of the earlier dynasty, thereby reasserting 
local royal history that the conquest had removed. 
As an instance of ancestor veneration, particularly imandwa or spirit-possession 
cults of the larger Great Lakes region, the Nyabingi cult shows a direct relationship to 
health and prosperity (Freedman 171, Berger 90). In precolonial Rwanda, ancestor- 
veneration served to provide a sense of identity within lineages by uniting familial groups 
of varying size under different historical predecessors.  The smallest basic political unit 
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consisted of three generations of patrilineal descent, associated with the hill on which 
they made their home. The head of each family had the responsibility of offering 
veneration to each male ancestor of the family since the founding of the lineage, thus it 
fell to him also to retain the genealogy of the lineage. In a more limited way than the god 
Imana, ancestors had a degree of control over the prosperity of their living descendants, 
according to custom. People might attribute senseless misfortune to a failure to propitiate 
one's ancestors (Maquet 26, 27). In addition to directly offering healing, imandwa spirits 
offered protection from the harmful ancestor spirits (Berger 73). One might interpret this 
power of healing and general wellbeing either as an imitation of the powers of prosperity 
the central king possessed, or as a means of subverting general allegiance to the powers 
of the king in times of deprivation. This possibility of healing as resistance becomes still 
stronger after the incorporation by the Rwandan central court of the cult of Ryangombe, 
another imandwa spirit.  Rwandan kings were able to make use of this cult to assert 
power and maintain loyalty throughout the kingdom (Berger 85). 
Nyabingi's influence over wellbeing, health, and prosperity clearly shows the cult 
was not only an independent political identity, but that it challenged the claims of the 
central court to supremacy. The king of the central court was believed to be the 
embodiment of Imana, whose name literally means “life” or “fecundity” in Kinyarwanda 
(Vansina Antecedents 82, 83).  The rise of the Nyabingi cult also responded to the 
increase in material demands made on this region by the king and other Tutsi lords. This 
system of lords spread throughout regions under court control, by order of the monarch 
(Vansina Antecedents 132). These new lords then made material demands on herders and 
farmers in the region in addition to those of local provincial rulers.  One must therefore 
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attribute the poverty of the northern regions that gave rise to the Nyabingi cult to the 
deprivations caused by centralization. It is at any rate at this time that Nyabingi's 
movement emerged, with a pronounced militarism (Berger 84). An especially severe 
form of cattle clientship emerged in the 1870s, from which time Vansina dated the 
polarization of Hutu and Tutsi political animosities. Following the change in clientship 
practices, only Hutu owed the menial client labor; Tutsi, even those of comparatively 
lower class, did not have the same obligations. Client obligations, moreover, saw a 
dramatic increase at this time. Designations of “Hutu” or “Tutsi” began to see much 
wider usage and became more closely affixed to individuals in these decades than they 
had been in the past (Vansina Antecedents 135, 136). 
The accumulation and distribution of regional wealth and resources was one goal 
of the Nyabingi movement, as if to imitate the function that the central court played for 
the rest of the country. Freedman notes that Nyabingi-invocation differed markedly from 
other imandwa movements in that while most involved a public initiation ceremony, at 
which the initiate imitated the spirit, in Nyabingi-invocation, the imandwa was accessed 
by a medium in a ritual similar to a private séance (Freedman 171). The shift in the ritual 
from initiation ceremony to séance is important, because access to the spirit went from 
being available to anyone, in theory, to being accessible exclusively by the medium. In 
the present case, the medium was Muhumusa, whose exclusive access gave her the 
privileged position of a royal claimant. Elizabeth Hopkins has noted that it is this 
hierarchical structure that enabled the Nyabingi cult to gain ascendancy over other 
imandwa cults. With a single leader able to contact the spirit, the Nyabingi cult achieved 
the possibilities for a higher degree of economic and political, as well as psychological, 
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influence over those both within the cult and outside it (Hopkins 261). At the same time, 
she claimed to speak for the imandwa spirit on behalf of economically oppressed people 
with their grievances (Vansina Antecdents 136, 137).  Nyabingi's powers included 
healing and counsel in mundane affairs (Freedman 171). The Nyabingi movement 
emerged as but one manifestation of a number of movements—brought on by increased 
exploitation in the late nineteenth century through Rwabugiri's expansionism and the 
implementation of more severe forms of cattle clientship—that proclaimed a powerful 
charismatic leader (Vansina Antecedents 135-137). Another such movement occurred in 
the 1890s in the southern part of Rwanda; the leader of this movement was a woman 
named Nyirafugi, who identified herself with Imana and claimed to have the power to 
increase the cattle possessed by people of her region and to influence the gender of their 
as-yet unborn children. Local people viewed her as a potential king-figure who might be 
able to lead them against the central court until Musinga's predecessor had her arrested 
and executed (Vansina Antecedents 137). 
By other methods, leaders of the Nyabingi movement could acquire material 
resources more directly. The leader of the most prominent Nyabingi cult, and the one on 
which this chapter focuses, Muhumusa, levied tribute from persons of the region with 
threats of reprisal from the spirit (Des Forges Defeat 103; Hopkins 259, 260). 
Ndungutse, leading what came to be the continuation of Muhumusa's cult by claiming to 
be her heir, acquired enough material wealth to offer large gifts of cattle to Europeans in 
hopes of garnering their support. Ndungutse had a drum to imitate the symbol of the 
king's divine authority; he also donned the central monarch's headdress and hairstyle, and 
he rode in a hammock carried by members of his entourage (Des Forges Defeat 121, 122; 
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Hopkins 260). Ndungutse advised inhabitants of the area of Rukiga to refuse tribute to 
the court and to drive out the notables who represented central authority (Des Forges 
Defeat 120). Although Ndungutse did not claim to be a Nyabingi medium, he did utilize 
the rhetoric of Muhumusa's movement and claim supernatural powers in battle (Des 
Forges Defeat 122). Iris Berger notes that, where the Nyabingi movement had authority, 
some mediums had enough authority to overrule that of lineage heads, though in most 
cases Nyabingi did not aim to supplant lineage authority but instead reinforced familial 
bonds (73). So the claims of this movement to influence prosperity found support 
through imposing levies on local populations and imitating the material opulence and 
symbolism of the central monarchy. 
While in Muhumusa's era, the cult was directed toward asserting local claims to 
power in an existing centralized political structure, and utilized cultural forms both local 
and shared with the center, to effect its political aims, it is important to add that women's 
leadership had an important psychological and structural effect. This effect is relevant 
primarily to the ability of the mediums to assert local authority in a patrilineal structure in 
which different clans had a “xenophobic” (to use Hopkins' term) relationship to each 
other (268). Hopkins asserts that male mediums in the cult wore women's clothing (260). 
In the case of the particularly effective Muhumusa, her initial authority derived primarily 
from her reputation for having supernatural control over the harm or well-being of 
individuals (Hopkins 259).  However, the fact that she was a woman in a region 
dominated by patrilineal clans allowed the Nyabingi cult to acquire a superordinate 
structure to those clans, whose authority, being philosophically vested in men, was 
seriously undermined.  This in turn enabled the cult to become the pre-eminent political 
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structure in the region (324, 327). The forms Muhumusa used in asserting herself as a 
supernatural as well as political entity, however, emerge directly from local and central 
traditions.  Nyabingi was closely associated with the royal lineage of Ndorwa, possibly 
its queen, while her claims to being wife of Rwabugiri gave her the status of queen 
mother of Rwanda, a position in theory equal to that of the king himself (Vansina 
Antecedents 38). The strength of the cult only increased after European colonization, 
although Hopkins asserts that the necessary forms and structure of the cult did not 
change, but the cult grew stronger while its leadership rallied the movement against 
Europeans instead of the court (324, 325). The anti-European resistance was not 
explicitly ideological; instead the cult sought to protect itself and decrease the increased 
demands for tax and labor the Europeans implemented (Hopkins 329). Nevertheless, the 
ideological incursions of Christianity and other European patriarchal forms serve as a 
logical focal point for the same kind of subversion Hopkins discusses in local regions, 
and Rwandans tended to despise most European influences. As European strength grew 
in the country, the legitimacy of the cult on all levels became seriously undermined 
(Hopkins 335). 
The Nyabingi movement most likely would not have emerged as strongly in 
another region. Des Forges notes that the court never completely integrated the regions 
bordering Rwanda to the north, in spite of military conquests in those regions (Des 
Forges Defeat 11). The court applied the term “Hutu” to inhabitants of northern 
kingdoms, implying that they were subjects to the central kingdom. However, rituals 
such as the First Fruits ceremony suggested a regional tension between the north and the 
center.  Furthermore, under the cycle of regnal names, two kings out of every four were 
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required to spend much of their lives abroad, suggesting again that the court was aware of 
weakness in these areas. The division ritually represented in the Nyabarongo river might 
be the most important geographical division in terms of historical conflict between social 
groups within the country. However, Western scholarship has long done a disservice to 
the reality of this division by portraying it as the site of “primordial,” or worse, “racial” 
conflict. 
European portrayals of this important division between the people of the region 
have taken many forms, and the idea that their conflicts are attributable to “race-hate” has 
a long history. A German soldier originally put the idea forward in 1898 (Vansina 
Antecedents 138). To assert the conflict as racial denies the history of the region, 
including processes of expansion and centralization, as well as economically oppressive 
circumstances endured by the people in the northern regions who came together in 
rebellion against the central kingdom. A long time after the worst of scientific race 
theories were discredited in Western scholarship, “migration hypotheses” continued to 
maintain the view that Rwanda consisted of two peoples of distinct origins, one of which 
was a subject indigenous population while the other was a foreign conqueror. More 
recently, constructivist views of ethnicity have been able to offer evidence that challenges 
the idea of Tutsi and Hutu as historically discrete groups of people.  Peter Uvin provides 
a clear definition of the constructivist view of ethnicity, especially as it relates to 
precolonial Rwanda: 
[The integration of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa] had gone far: they spoke the same language, 
believed in the same god, shared the same culture, belonged to joint clans, and lived side by 
side throughout the country. There are few cases anywhere in the world of different ethnic 
groups sharing so many of the same characteristics. This led many to challenge the notion of 
the existence of ethnic groups in Rwanda. This is erroneous: ethnicity is not a matter of 
“objective” cultural of physical distinctions but rather is a social construct, an “imagined 
community” (Anderson, 1991), preoccupied with the creation of boundaries between in- 
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groups and out-groups (Barth, 1969) (Uvin 14, 15). 
 
I have demonstrated that ethnic boundaries in Rwanda prior to colonialism, and even 
through much of the colonial period, were permeable. Jan Vansina and Catharine 
Newbury, have offered evidence that the terms refer more to residence and status in 
proximity to the elites of the central kingdom than they refer to groups indigenous to 
different regions, or, as Jacques Maquet asserted, that the terms refer to persons of 
different occupation in a caste system. 
When one views the spirit-possession cults of the north as a push for 
representation and successful movement of resistance against the court, the destruction of 
these cults by German administrators becomes even more significant. The Germans 
eliminated the cults by military forces out of a policy of indirect rule that favored the 
central court. In so doing, the German administration assisted in suppressing one element 
in a society that was on a brink of plurality and class-consciousness. When the Belgian 
and French missionaries of the 1940s and 1950s turned on the Tutsi in support of Hutu, it 
was to the Hutu as an oppressed people, but also the Hutu as the native “race” of Rwanda 
over Tutsi as the foreign conquering “race.” Had the processes of regional and social 
conflict that arose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries been allowed to run 
their course, the very terminology of Tutsi and Hutu, with their court-centered value- 
positive and value-negative connotations, may well have fallen into disuse. Since, as 
scholars Timothy Longman, Alison Des Forges, and Jan Vansina has observed, the 
central court was not able to suppress northern movements of revolt or fully integrate 
these regions into the central kingdom without European military aid, it seems all the 
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more likely that this interpretation should hold. 
 
Contrary to interpretations that emphasize the Nyabingi revolt only as a 
matter of Tutsi-Hutu conflict, this chapter presents the movement in terms of cultural 
discourse in response to certain socioeconomic and historical factors. The actions of 
the central court, as well as rituals including the First Fruits ceremony, the Path of the 
Watering, and the geographical requirements of the cycles of regnal names 
demonstrated a consciousness of weakness of the central kingdom in the north. But 
the possibility of invasions and the encroachment of oppressive economic measures 
created a hostility in the north that eventually resulted in a reaction embodied in the 
Nyabingi movement (Vansina Antecedents 135, 136). Nevertheless, the Nyabingi cult 
is best understood as a protest on the part of the north for representation at court that 
they were unable to achieve. It was also a response to a court that had contradicted its 
own logic of succession by rebelling against Rwabugiri's chosen heir Rutarindwa in 
favor of Musinga, of the queen-mother's faction. The refusal of the court to grant 
representation to its subjects brought about a revolt in the north that had a real 
possibility of overthrowing the government, were it not for the intervention of the 
German armies in the early twentieth century to crush the movement. It was when the 
court showed inconsistency in justifying an illegitimate coup and then accepted the 
help of Europeans in controlling the country that the Nyabingi cult began threatening 
an invasion on the south. For court members, the coup was more acceptable, since 
they had access and influence in the central power structure. My discussion of these 
spirit-possession cults provides support for a view of precolonial Rwanda that is 
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complex and dynamic, and offers an interpretation that emphasizes cultural and social 
discourse rather than merely conflict. 
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Conclusion: The Role of Discourse in Precolonial Conflict 
 
 
The examples in this thesis provide a clearer understanding of the ways in which 
Rwandan actors organized society, distributing, maintaining, and contesting power as 
embodied in the central court and the divine king. This view of Rwandan society helps to 
illustrate and corroborate the constructivist theory of religious myth and ritual that Bruce 
Lincoln outlines in Discourse and the Construction of Society.  To return to his 
discussion of myth and ritual as doing the work of organizing society through taxonomy, 
Lincoln writes of myth that it “is not just a coding device in which important information 
is conveyed, on the basis of which actors can then construct society.  It is also a 
discursive act through which actors evoke the sentiments out of which society is actively 
constructed” (25).  He says of ritual: 
Like myth, ritual is best understood as an authoritative mode of symbolic discourse and a 
powerful instrument for the evocation of those sentiments (affinity and estrangement) out of 
which society is constructed.  The differences between the two, although hardly negligible, 
are in large measure a matter of genre, ritual discourse being primarily gestural and dramatic; 
mythic discourse, verbal and narrative (53). 
 
My emphasis throughout the thesis has been on the socially constructed nature of myth 
and ritual as seen in precolonial Rwanda out of social and political factors. Although the 
methodologies I have applied are strongly rooted in the Western academy, the thrust of 
this essay has been to reverse the trend of emphasis on conflict and violence and focus on 
discourse instead. 
Drawing from the work on ethnic boundaries by Fredrik Barth, which is also of a 
distinctively constructivist point of view, this essay has shown how earlier Eurocentric 
taxonomies of Rwandan society into Hutu and Tutsi wrongly did so on the basis of “race” 
or “tribe”, as though in some way the two groups fundamentally differed at the level of 
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identity. Rather than accepting essentialist views of ethnicity that see groups as differing 
on the basis of content, Barth argues that the crucial point in defining ethnicity as being 
the boundary between ethnic groups, or, “the cultural materials that the actors themselves 
are deploying to construct their own identities and actions,...not whatever cultural 
materials the analyst might wish to bring in to characterize cultural differences that may 
persist between two populations” (6). While the subject of the book Barth edited, Ethnic 
Groups and Boundaries, is ethnic boundary-maintenance, he notes in his introduction 
something that is key to understanding the relationship between “Hutu” and “Tutsi” 
groups such as the existed prior to colonialism.  Barth writes: 
[A] system of stratification does not entail the existence of ethnic groups.  Leach (1967) 
argues convincingly that social classes are distinguished by different sub-cultures, indeed, that 
this is a more basic characteristic than their hierarchical ordering. However in many systems 
of stratification we are not dealing with bounded strata at all: the stratification is based simply 
on the notion of scales and the recognition of an ego-centered level of 'people who are just  
like us' versus those more select and those more vulgar.... Ethnic groups are not open to this 
kind of penetration: the ascription of ethnic identity is based on other and more restrictive 
criteria. This is most clearly illustrated by Knutsson's analysis of the Galla in the context of 
Ethiopian society....[T]he attainment of a governorship does not make an Amhara of a Galla, 
nor does estrangement as an outlaw entail the loss of Galla identity. (27) 
 
I argue that it is the model of class and status that really serves to represent the 
precolonial situation in Rwanda than the model of alternately ethnic, race, or tribal 
conflict. It is necessary to keep in mind, in keeping with Barth's distinction between what 
actors themselves use to construct identity as opposed to what analysts use, Mamdani's 
argument that European rulers constructed Rwanda as divided between two different 
antagonistic races (87-102). Mamdani has also shown how in restructuring relations 
between the two groups during the Second Republic (the Hutu administration under 
Juvenal Habyarimana, 1973-1994), the government viewed Tutsi as an “ethnicity” rather 
than a “race.”  This change was able to retire the colonial idea that the Tutsi had a foreign 
origin, although as a minority ethnicity they were only entitled to limited participation in 
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government (138). 
 
In reality, both racial and ethnic terms used to describe Hutu and Tutsi are 
projections onto the past from the present. Although Hutu and Tutsi of precolonial 
Rwanda had clear distinctions of social status and material culture they nevertheless 
shared a common language and culture of religious symbols and institutions that illustrate 
a single ethnic community. The expressions differed depending on the actor and their 
intentions. 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I analyzed a Rwandan origins myth that provides 
information as to the identities of “Tutsi,” “Hutu,” and “Twa” as the discourse of the 
precolonial kingdom constructed them. Since, in this origins myth, the identities of each 
character correlates to competency and leadership, I have interpreted the myth as a 
product of centralization and the hierarchy that centralization produced. This myth does 
not give the idea that Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa identities are intrinsic or “racial,” as European 
systems of thought would later claim. It also makes no mention of occupational 
characteristics such as herding, farming, or hunting, or any intrinsic physical 
characteristics. Instead, these identities are constructed as pertaining to the abilities of 
each character, with Tutsi exhibiting the greatest deal of self-control and the faculty of 
anger linked with the position of command.  Hutu lacks Tutsi's faculties of self-control 
and leadership and is fit for labor, while Twa is gluttonous and receives a marginalized 
position in this construction of society. The evidence available shows that although these 
statuses were generally true throughout the country, there were exceptions in which Hutu 
or Twa were patrons, or when a person's identity changed during the course of their 
lifetime as their socioeconomic status changed.  This information contradicts the view of 
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Rwandan society that says that Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa are radically different groups, even 
to the extent that they are discrete “ethnicities” with definite, essential characteristics. 
The view of Rwandan society found in this myth does not account for geographical 
distinctions that determined whether one was considered “Tutsi” or “Hutu.” 
In the second chapter, I discussed the First Fruits ritual and the patterns of travel 
of the Rwandan monarchs.  I argued that these rituals illustrate a recognition on the part 
of the central court of the disparities in class and geography that were some of the major 
distinctions between “Tutsi” and “Hutu” late in the precolonial era. The First Fruits ritual 
involved a reciprocity between the king serving in his ritual function and an unidentified 
“Hutu” to symbolize the ideology of the court that legitimated the king's authority over 
the Hutu as essential to Hutu prosperity. This ritual included the use of the Nyabarongo 
River as the symbolic division between the north and south of the kingdom, which in 
essence stood for the geographical division between Hutu- and Tutsi-dominant regions. 
For this ritual, the king accepted the symbolic diminishing of his status in order to present 
him as in a sense the servant or guarantor of the prosperity of the Hutu.  The restrictions 
on the king's residence and travel attempted to ensure the unity of Rwanda and the 
continued success of court power over peripheral regions.  In this sense, the king was 
both the symbolic and the real mediator of power between the center and the periphery of 
the kingdom. These rituals represent a conservative means of legitimating and 
perpetuating a system of centralized authority that attempted to address, though it did not 
resolve, disparities in power and prosperity that existed between Hutu and Tutsi. 
The first two chapters discuss uses of myth and ritual by the central court for 
purposes of legitimating the power of the status quo.  The third chapter discussed the 
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appearance of spirit-possession cults as a means of contesting centralized power at the 
peripheral regions. Using the example of the Nyabingi cult, I have shown that this spirit- 
possession cult created a hub of power in the north that contested the power of the center 
and the legitimacy of the king. The ability of the leadership to use the logic of succession 
against the monarch and the dynamics of power that brought the center into conflict with 
the periphery over the matter of ancestor-veneration demonstrate further that precolonial 
Rwanda including both Hutu and Tutsi is a single, dynamic, and complex society that 
demonstrates unequal distributions of power.  Resistance movements arose that drew 
from a common religious culture to challenge central power. The representation of the 
Hutu on behalf of leadership of these movements, which was in some cases Tutsi, or 
which followers described as Tutsi, shows how these movements came to transcend the 
regionality of the Hutu/Tutsi dichotomy.  This is true of them though they at the same 
time represented a profoundly local resistance movement. 
The purpose of this thesis has been to illustrate that precolonial Rwanda was a 
complex society that had a large degree of unity and stability. This was true although 
conflicts over power, including the differences between regions that emerged from 
centralization, expansion, and conquest, and the inequalities created by these processes of 
centralization and accumulation of wealth and resources led to deep divisions.  My hope 
is that this thesis will be useful in re-conceptualizing the precolonial era as a precursor to 
a unified future country of Rwanda that lacks the outdated division that still exists 
between Hutu and Tutsi. To do this, it has been necessary to re-examine these terms as 
products of a particular way of constructing Rwandan society. This thesis reverses the 
scholarly approach that emphasizes conflict without contextualizing conflict according to 
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relevant social discourse. The northern revolution looked at itself as part of the social 
construct by which the central kingdom was under obligation to its subjects. This 
contractual basis served as the impetus for resistance, organized according to the religious 
practices of the region. This reconceptualization of the history of conflict serves another 
purpose.   The  current  president  of  Rwanda,  Paul  Kagame,  has  placed   a             
moratorium on the use of the old “ethnic” labels in hopes that silence will solve the 
conflicts (Straus and Waldorf “Introduction” 8).  While it is to be hoped that this 
approach will prove effective, I argue that a more lasting solution will emerge from 
critically examining the origins of these terms and their usages as a way of 
reconceptualizing Rwandans as members of a single contested society. As Mamdani 
states, “To break the stranglehold of Hutu Power and Tutsi Power on Rwanda's politics, 
one also needs to break their stranglehold on Rwanda's history writing, and thus history 
making” (Victims 268). I believe that the work I have presented more accurately reflects 
the historical reality of the Rwandan people. 
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Epilogue: Discourse and the Construction of Rwandan Society Today 
 
 
In closing, I discuss the discourse surrounding persisting dispute between Hutu 
and Tutsi political identities in present-day Rwanda. In spite of efforts at removing these 
political identities from the public sphere by the government, there remains strong 
opposition between the administration—whom critics identify as predominated by 
Tutsi—and self-identified Hutu who continue to face exclusion from power. In the wake 
of genocide, the rhetoric between the two sides has remained apocalyptic in its tendency 
to see the conflict in black-or-white terms. While proponents of Rwanda's current 
government under president Paul Kagame see the country's direction as moving from a 
state of genocidal darkness to the light of development and prosperity, critics see the 
administration as using totalitarian means to suppress dissent.  Today, mass media and 
the internet have become the means for transmitting the rhetoric utilized by either side, as 
the government and its opposition clash over the possibilities for unity and mutual 
prosperity in Rwanda's future, the role of Western donors and “experts” in constructing 
that future, and what president Kagame's legacy ultimately means for the well-being of 
the country. In spite of strides the country has made economically since the genocide, the 
two sides remain diametrically opposed on nearly all positions, including whether or not 
the events of 1994 even constituted genocide at all. Opponents of Kagame's government 
often claim the genocide is itself a fabrication, while the government views oppositional 
politics in any form as belonging to the mentality of genocide denial that is a reality 
among the most vitriolic of its Hutu critics.  This epilogue will show how the conflict 
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between Hutu and Tutsi remains a black-or-white, up-or-down rhetorical battle today. 
This in turn demonstrates the importance of problematizing these identities historically, 
understanding their reality as social constructs, and recognizing sociopolitical realities 
that threaten to preserve these hostilities as Rwanda moves forward under Kagame's 
governance. 
The controversy over the government’s approach to ethnicity as a matter of public 
discourse arises in part because of Article 54 of the Rwandan Constitution, ratified in 
2003.  The clause states: 
Political organizations are prohibited from basing themselves on race, ethnic group, tribe, 
clan, region, sex, religion or any other division which may give rise to discrimination. 
Political organizations must constantly reflect the unity of the people of Rwanda and gender 
equality and complementality, whether in the recruitment of members, putting in place organs 
of leadership and in their operations and activities. 
 
The wording in the clause strongly reflects the emphasis on unity and equality that 
president Kagame has tried to convey as a key feature of Rwandan society moving 
forward. Yet the removal of ethnicity as an organizing principle in Rwandan politics has 
created a dilemma. The RPF, which is the political party to which president Kagame 
belongs, is predominantly Tutsi who first organized as refugees in Uganda. Several 
critics have noted that Hutu receive marginal positions in political power as well as the 
burgeoning economy as a result, yet Hutu may not organize in representation of 
themselves as such. When one looks at the political discourse in Rwanda between 
Kagame and his critics, it immediately becomes clear that identities of Tutsi and Hutu 
remain critical distinctions for this society. Yet the moratorium on ethnicity as an 
organizing principle in effect prohibits nuanced discussion of how identities have been 
and remain constructed differently at different times.  In direct result of this, members of 
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both sides discuss the conflict in terms that are starkly black and white. 
 
Kagame himself, as Rwanda’s foremost political personality, is comparatively 
moderate in his public statements on relationships between Tutsi and Hutu. Yet his 
words convey a definite bias toward the Tutsi, and the idea of Tutsi innocence as being 
the fundamental truth of genocide and consequently of social justice in the wake of 
genocide remains a clear priority of his. In a recent interview published online in mid- 
2014 entitled “Rebooting Rwanda: A Conversation With Paul Kagame,” the president 
emphasized unity, reconciliation, and progress, he stated, “After total disintegration, the 
country is making progress, because the country has come back together. Rwanda has 
come back to life in many forms….In the gacaca courts [courts where defendants 
accused of genocide went to trial], justice was intertwined with reconciliation, almost in 
equal measure” (pg. 3, 9). He also pointed to the fact that many who were found guilty 
went free if they showed remorse and proved they had no choice but to commit acts of 
genocide (pg. 11). A long-standing criticism of the RPF pursuit of justice in the wake of 
the genocide has been that the government ignored acts of violence committed by Tutsi 
against innocent Hutu. Kagame’s remarks distinguish between acts of genocide, which 
he categorizes as exclusively perpetrated by Hutu against Tutsi, and acts of war, which 
Tutsi may have perpetrated in reprisal against Hutu (pg. 23, 24). When pressed to 
comment upon the numerical inequalities in number of persons tried that critics see as 
self-evidently demonstrating a bias in favor of Tutsi, Kagame countered that there is no 
standard by which to gauge proportionality. In a response to an observation that only 20 
Tutsi went to trial for war crimes, the president stated: “[H]ow many should have been 
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tried?  Is it 100?  500?  1,000?  I ask you, how many did you want or did you expect? 
You can’t just play with numbers and say, ‘No, it should have been something more than 
this.’ Based on what?” Kagame’s key distinction was that in the genocide crimes were 
committed by civilians, whereas acts of violence against civilians in the case of reprisals 
were the responsibility of commanders; he added that in trying genocidaires, courts also 
gave priority to degree of responsibility (pg. 27-29). 
Kagame also relied on what he saw as the subjective nature of the question in 
responding to whether Rwanda has achieved political openness: 
I never see a conflict between political openness and social and economic development. 
Rather, I think the two are intertwined, even if you think one is lagging behind.  The social 
and economic development indicators are very clear. But political openness, or whatever you 
call it, is subjective. Everybody has a right to define it the way they want, because there isn’t 
tangible specific data to base it on. (pg. 41) 
 
The interviewer then defined political openness as: 
 
[H]aving a free press that’s able to function without fear of government reprisal. It means the 
freedom to register political parties based on ideology and to hold contested elections where 
parties can compete on an even footing. And it means the freedom for individuals to speak 
freely and openly, without fear of repercussions, except maybe in extreme cases. (pg. 44) 
 
Kagame in his reply said both that, “Different countries have different standards,” and 
“[M]y own standards are no different from other standards,” without addressing point-by- 
point the standard as the interviewer worded it (pg. 44, 45). 
Kagame’s justification of the status quo in Rwanda includes drawing distinctions 
between how to try Tutsi as opposed to Hutu following the genocide, broadly defined in 
terms prima facie more favorable to Tutsi. He falls back on the subjective nature of 
terms and definitions and insists on the prosperity, equality, and political opportunity for 
the “Rwandan people” without assessing whether real disparities exist. Supporters of 
Kagame similarly tend to deny any ongoing legal or political reality to the terms Hutu 
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and Tutsi and to accuse critics of the administration of conspiracy, reactionary behavior, 
or genocide denial. The online newspaper www.newsofrwanda.com is one example of a 
news source that has accused Westerners including journalists, documentarians, or 
members of Human Rights Watch of conspiring against or of seeking to undermine 
president Kagame. 
On the side of critics of the administration is the newspaper 
www.therwandan.com. The political language one finds in this source is black-or-white 
with Kagame as a propagandist and tyrant.  One such article published in December, 
2014 by Ambrose Nzeyimana accused Kagame of using deception to control Western 
influence, accepting money from donors then decrying Western influence when he 
receives pressure to leave office at the end of his term in 2017. The language of 
genocide-denial is thick in Nzeyimana’s piece, and the author uses the ethnic terms 
throughout his article, with the words “Hutu” and “Tutsi” written in all capital letters 
when they appear. Nzeyimana accuses Kagame and the RPF of “Palestinizing” the Hutu 
community by “treating them the way Palestinians have been treated since the creation of 
Israel: as pariahs” (pg. 10).  Nzeyimana states: 
In the census 1991, there were three ethnic groups in Rwanda, recorded proportionally as in 
the following statistical figures: HUTU (85%); TUTSI (14%); and TWA (1%). These 
numbers might have significantly changed since for different reasons, the main one being war. 
According to today’s upheld propaganda, prevalent especially since 1994 and which is found 
in many circles dominated by TUTSI extremists across the world, HUTU are genocidaires. 
That propaganda preaches that HUTU are genetically born with the intend [sic] to kill 
TUTSI…. The [Tutsi exiled during the 1950s] had well observed how effectively the then 
‘civilized’ world had come to the rescue of the Jews during Adolf Hitler military campaigns 
across Europe of WWII [sic]. At the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, the Rwandan ruling 
TUTSI elite found that by using the genocide card to attract international sympathy for its 
minority leading community, its royal and political privileges could be safeguarded. 
Approximately thirty years later, in 1994, having refined all the required 
propaganda…understandably with the help of all foreign vested interests which found 
appropriate to be associated to the new propagandists of genocide, the accusation succeeded. 
Today, it is widely accepted by many uninformed people outside Rwanda that HUTU are 
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genocidaires. This might not be their fault because broad interested parties have heavily 
invested in that propaganda of tarnishing the image of HUTU for strategic reasons. (pg. 1-9) 
 
Using not only genocide denial but even Holocaust denial amid undercurrents of anti- 
Semitism, Nzeyimana states the political conflict as one in which Tutsi are all 
propagandists and Western conspirators; not only is the 1994 “genocide” only a tool of 
that propaganda, he says, but the Tutsi are casting the Hutu in overtly racist terms as 
genetically prone to committing such acts of violence. 
The rhetoric is uncompromising on either side: the government denies the 
existence of disparity or political contention, while its critics deny the crimes against 
humanity that brought the government to power in the first place. The remainder of this 
epilogue will argue for ways in which present-day Rwanda shows a large amount of 
promise but also displays lingering problems that a change in the black-or-white nature of 
ethnic discourse may help to expose and rectify. The legacy of colonization, originally 
responsible for the creation of the division of Rwanda into “racial” or “ethnic” groups 
based on imposed class division threatens a re-emergence if Hutu, categorized broadly as 
“genocidaires” continue not to have access to power or equality in the neoliberal 
economy. 
While many studies have focused on the history of conflict between Hutu and 
Tutsi as though this were the primary source of conflict in Rwanda's history, it might be 
more accurate to say that the country's most persistent enemy is poverty. Economic 
analyses of the genocide of 1994 have shown that what had been a model of African 
development plunged into chaos in part because of mounting debts and a crisis of natural 
resources (Uvin 4).  Historians of the precolonial and colonial era have emphasized the 
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material exploitation of peasants by elites as creating the polarization of Hutu and Tutsi 
into opposed political identities (Vansina Antecedents 138; Mamdani 9-14). Given these 
arguments, it is no wonder that the focus of the Kagame administration has been the 
development of a robust economy. Kagame's leadership of the country reflects his focus 
on this goal, and his style has earned him the nickname “Rwanda's CEO.” True to his 
sobriquet, Kagame publicly eschews international aid as he seeks to renew Rwanda as an 
economically viable country. The authors of Rwanda, Inc. state Kagame's approach as 
follows: 
President Paul Kagame preaches a gospel of economic self-reliance, turning the country, 
especially the younger generation, into a nation of believers.... The only way to cut 
dependence on foreign aid is private investment from local and foreign business interests, 
which creates jobs and opportunities—and generates tax revenue. 
 
Kagame's favorable attitude toward large investors is highlighted in Rwanda, Inc.: “The 
Rwanda Revenue Authority presents certificates each year to the best taxpayers, 
recognizing those who pay the most (the Rwandan brewery Bralirwa has been a past 
honoree, along with a foreign-owned telecommunications company) as well as those who 
are the most compliant” (Crisafulli and Redmond 111, 112). This favoritism toward 
private investors and big business has made some progress in fighting poverty, but the 
numbers still do not compare favorably with percentages elsewhere.  In 2011, Rwanda 
still had 44.9 percent poverty, with about 80 percent of the population living as 
subsistence farmers (Crisafulli and Redmond 3, 113). 
One of the main points that I argued is that prior to colonialism, identities of Hutu 
and Tutsi—what people today identify as Rwanda's “ethnicities”—began as class 
identities that distinguished persons who identified with the material wealth of the central 
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court from those who did not. The latter group were the poor and those who lived in 
peripheral regions where expansion and centralization were not very far advanced. What 
amounts to promotion of neoliberal, market-centered economics that focuses 
development in the capital of Kigali risks creating the same kind of centralized political 
and economic structure that characterized the earlier iterations of the Rwandan state. 
Since Kagame's political power rests in part on suppression of opposition, the potential 
for a relapse into violence remains a threat, particularly in the event that oppositional 
candidates do not have the same opportunities for office that RPF-backed candidates do. 
The Kagame administration has enacted policies that it has presented as 
“decentralizing,” but in reality these programs are more likely to lead to greater 
channeling of control into the hands of the central government. Imihigo and umudugudu 
are the key terms in this government's policies that it claims lead to decentralization. 
Imihigo is a term drawn from precolonial Rwandan society that refers to a vow taken 
before a chief. The vow invested communal support in the one making the vow on the 
basis of that person's ability to accomplish a public goal (Crisafulli and Redmond 123, 
124). In its usage in the modern state of Rwanda, however, imihigo refers to the 
appointment of human development tasks to local elected authorities by central 
authorities who most often receive their offices through appointment from still higher up 
(Ingelaere 73).  In at least one instance, elections at the local level have seen 
manipulation from above by RPF members and soldiers, in spite of official bans on party 
activity during elections (Ingelaere 71, 72).  Numerous RPF-approved candidates gave 
the appearance of free elections, while non-RPF candidates could not run. Following 
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elections, these local “representatives” only have the responsibility of carrying out 
directives made by their government-appointed superiors (Ingelaere 72). Recently, this 
hierarchy has come to extend to private households in local areas (Ingelaere 72). 
Appointment of local officials purports to provide local representation over development 
projects; however, they are really under central authority. The extension of these 
hierarchies only serves to strengthen centralization; it does not lead to local 
representation. 
Umudugudu, or government-sponsored relocation of rural populations into 
villages, is a part of this program that the Kagame administration has defended as 
decentralizing Rwanda. In pursuing this policy, the administration has ignored the 
negative effects of similar policies in Tanzania, Mozambique, and Ethiopia (C. Newbury 
“Imidugudu” 225). The umudugudu villages are relocations of rural peasants from their 
scattered traditional homesteads, and the Rwandan government under Paul Kagame has 
undertaken this procedure without the authorization or input of the majority population. 
This villagization has oftentimes relied on coercion of peasants and resulted in many 
negative consequences. These have included inadequate provision of services and 
amenities, negative environmental effects, including deforestation and overuse of fields 
near villages, as well as loss of risk aversion from scattered farming techniques used by 
peasants in many regions. Increases in accusations of theft and sorcery have also 
accompanied concentration of rural populations through villagization (C. Newbury 
“Imidugudu” 225). Monocropping and regional specialization of agriculture have 
replaced the approach of individual, non-profit-oriented farmers to cultivating different 
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kinds of produce. 
 
In addition to loss of representation and livelihood among rural farmers, the 
policy of the present administration of Rwanda has been to attribute the poverty of rural 
areas to the poor themselves. The rhetoric diverges sharply from the positive rhetoric of 
Juvenal Habyarimana's administration to these groups, when he in 1987 credited them 
with Rwanda's successes in development. By contrast, Kagame and others inside his 
administration have attributed the poverty of the poor exclusively on the poor, saying 
each citizen has the responsibility to overcome poverty himself or herself. As one 
southern province official stated: “You talk to them and you think they listen, but the 
people do nothing with the good advice you give them. They say 'yes' because they are 
tired of you and your speeches, but they are never convinced.... They are resistant, they 
are really difficult” (Ansom 243). The tendency of the administration again shows a 
marked tendency to embracing neoliberal market doctrines and centralization of the 
structures of government.  The Kagame administration can point to a 12% drop in 
poverty from 2006-2011 to justify its economic programs (Crisafulli and Redmond 113). 
However, poverty remains at epidemic levels for the country, and overwhelmingly the 
poor are Hutu, their appointed or questionably elected officials remaining Tutsi. Under 
these circumstances, the possibility for future ethnic fragmentation over the issue of 
inequalities of wealth remains a serious threat, unless leaders attuned to Hutu problems 
have the opportunity to represent the constituency of the country. 
In Imagining Religion, Jonathan Z. Smith made the following statement: 
 
[C]haracteristic history of religions materials such as myths are best approached as “common 
stories,” as pieces of prosaic discourse rather than as multivalent, condensed, highly symbolic 
speech.  In short, I hold that there is no privilege to myth or other religious materials. They 
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must be understood primarily as texts in context, specific acts of communication between 
specified individuals, at specific points in time and space, about specifiable subjects.... For 
the historian of religion, the task then becomes one of imagining the “situation,” of 
constructing the context, insofar as it is relevant to his interpretative goals. This implies, as 
well, that there is no privilege in the so-called exotic. For there is no primordium—it is all 
history.  There is no “other,”—it is all “what we see in Europe every day (xiii). 
 
Drawing from Smith and also from the work of Fredrik Barth and Bruce Lincoln, I have 
used this thesis to stress the importance of power and class in determining the 
relationships between ethnic groups in Rwanda, drawing from my examination of 
precolonial religious practices. I have also explored the social and economic policies of 
the present-day administration of Paul Kagame. I add my voice to other voices that have 
called President Kagame not to neglect the warnings of history as his government seeks 
to create a thriving country with a centralized structure. 
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